Making plans that restrict your later actions is not, in general, a bad idea. Deciding not to continue my violin lessons some sixty years ago pretty well ensured that I was thereafter cut off from any futures involving playing violin in a string quartet, something I now faintly regret, but life is full of opportunity costs, and I bear that one gladly, since I think the life I have led without the violin is probably much, much happier than the life I would have led had I gritted my teeth and stuck with it. If my imagined apoptosis system existed and I availed myself of it, I might come to regret—even bitterly regret—having ensured my own demise by some random time shy of my 90th birthday, but it might still be true that the life I led, having committed myself to that course, was much better, all things considered, than any life I could have led without that commitment.

A question for those who just don’t see the point I’m trying to make: suppose today you got a credible offer of a two hundred year lifespan by taking a purple pill (and it’s free, if that matters). You have to take the pill now, and you don’t get any guarantees at all about what sort of life you’ll be living after, say, your 90th birthday. Do you take the pill? Think of how knowing something about your longevity will probably distort the rest of your life if you take the pill. Is it obvious that you should opt for the pill?

Dan thinks (now) that there would be more peace of mind in one’s last years (or maybe in one’s earlier ones too) if everyone were signed up for a no-opt-out 80-85 apoptosis policy.

When I was in my sophomoric teens, I contemplated having a vasectomy, “It is selfish and wrong for people to reproduce — to create, out of nothing, a potential for suffering, with the patient being someone other than themselves. (No potential for pleasure can compensate for this.)”

Friends said: Are you sure? What if, when you get older, you start to feel broody. You may rue this decision. It’s irreversible. You can’t opt out afterwards.

My (sophomoric) reply: “If I change my mind later on, it serves me right. What I think and feel now is right. If I change my mind at a later, then I’ll be wrong, then. I disavow my later avatar.”

But I never got ’round to having that vasectomy. And I did reach the broody age, when I was glad I had not, and declared my prior callow incarnation to have been the one that was wrong.

But I never got ’round to breeding either. (And now I’ve reached an age where I think I was right the first time.)

All by way of an analogy with Dan’s stance. What about freedom? And variations and variability in the life cycle? Is humankind to be pre-inscribed in a genetically engineered, no-opt-out 80-85 apoptosis policy? Without consultation? After a plebiscite? Does everyone feel that’s right for them?

Will Dan feel that way in the compos mentis and creative ’90s that I fervently wish upon him?

If Chris Hitchens had remained alive, compos mentis and creative till his ’90s, would he not have opted to keep struggling to live, think and write till the very last moment, as he did, mortally ill in his ’60s?

There is a pattern to be found in these comments, and I can’t decide whether to be amused or bemused by it, frustrated or vindicated: the main point of my essay has escaped comment by all. I was not proposing whole body apoptosis (WBA, as William Bauer has abbreviated it) as an alternative to voluntary active euthanasia or any other kind of euthanasia. I am all in favor of letting people arrange for their own deaths on their own schedules whenever they feel moved to do so. My proposal can be seen, in fact, as a way of protecting the practice of voluntary active euthanasia from many of the pressures that now beset it.

I was proposing WBA as a way of removing from life’s burdens many of the opportunities that modern technology has vouchsafed us. Robert Nozick wrote of “coercive offers” and I am speaking of coercive opportunities: the myriad occasions and methods we now all have to engage in incessant self-monitoring: is my life good enough, am I healthy enough, have I lived too long? Am I still in the top ten or top one hundred on any scale, or has my ranking slipped (as professional, as grandparent, as object of desire, as entertainer, as friend, as neighbor)? We now live in a world in which quality control is possible on a day-to-day or even minute-to-minute basis across a wide spectrum of attributes, and many people seem to be bizarrely interested in tracking their trajectories on all these scales. We are in danger of becoming obsessive pulse-takers. Kurt Baier’s quip about the overexamined life not being anything to write home about is not just funny. It is, I think, deep and wise.

I am delighted to learn that my friend Stevan Harnad thinks “the world would be far, far better off with Dan Dennetts staying around as long as they are compos mentis” but I don’t want him, or society, or anybody else doing the assay to determine when I am no longer compos mentis enough to be welcome. And I don’t want to worry about it myself. I want that “decision” taken out of my hands, so that I can live my life full bore, without constant examination of the options. In place of his “individual, objective criteria” I want to put an arbitrary boundary, determined by nothing but blind chance.

Let me suggest a comparison. Mandatory retirement has now been abolished in universities in the United States, and as a result, many academics are hanging around longer than they really should, because nobody has the heart to tell them they are no longer pulling their weight. I expect that few would approve of a reform that instituted “individual, objective criteria” in an annual test which would leave aging professors filled with anxiety about whether or not they would pass this year’s 71-plus exam. Better to have an arbitrary rule. “My hands are tied,” the Dean would say, gratefully. “It’s the rule.”

Why, I asked in Consciousness Explained (1991, pp452-3), do we not simply discard the corpses of our friends with the trash when they die? You obviously can’t harm a corpse in any important way, and the person you loved no longer exists. The answer, clearly, is that as anticipating agents, we are constantly looking ahead as best we can, and we find that anticipating a future with one’s body treated with respect and decorum is less alarming, more comforting now, than imagining any sort of defilement or negligence. The belief environment in which we exist makes a big difference to our subjective well-being.

What I am suggesting in this essay is that our belief environment is now threatened by our growing capacity to prolong life but also to measure life, in hundreds of ways. (And whenever a capacity becomes widely exploited those who resist adopting it come under social pressure, not always subtle.) If you don’t want to have to shield your eyes from a hundred dials installed on your wrist letting you know that your health just went up from C+ to B- but your IQ dropped ten points in the last month and your worldwide popularity is now in steady decline, you should start thinking about the virtues of ignorance. There are some things we just don’t want to know, so we should consider taking steps now so that there won’t be any good reason to find these things out in the future.

Nick Humphrey suggests that a longer lame duck period—-not ten minutes but nine months of inverse gestation—-would be a likely improvement. Maybe he is right. I thought that the benefits of organizing farewell ceremonies and institutions would be soon provided by the recognition by all that when somebody has entered their period of final jeopardy (ouch), this is a time to get reflective and celebratory, and the sooner the better since you never know when somebody’s number will come up. But these and other options are worth exploring further. Nick and I have an old friend and colleague, Nina Murray, now 91, who speaks gallantly of leaving her home and going off to her “finishing school” where she now “circles the drain”. If we could all face death with her humor and clear-headedness, life itself would be better.

Twenty years ago I wrote a story titled “The man who took his own death”. In the story the man, who is chosen at random, is given a drug that will kill him in exactly seven days time. But an antidote does indeed exist, and what the victim has to do is to persuade a jury of his peers that he should be given it. The jury meets every night to consider his arguments as to why they should intevene to save his life – the life of someone who will otherwise die. The story can end several ways. The philosopher Bernard Williams, whom I consulted on the ending, said that no one could make the case that that their life has intrinsic value, so the victim has to die. Dan, whom I also consulted, said that everyone could make that case, so he has to live. But the man in my story was in his 40’s. What if he is 85?

Another issue. Studies of happiness show that, as people grow old, unless and until they become ill or incapacitated, their general level of contentment goes on rising, even as the certainty of death approaches. I have written recently, in my book Soul Dust, about death as the “ultimate betrayal” of human hopes for the continuity of the individual soul. Dylan Thomas, addressing his dying father, called on him to “Rage, rage against the dying of the light.” But the reality seems to be that this is a young man’s prayer. Old people are surprisingly content to go quietly. I wonder about the evolutionary psychology of this. Since an old person raging against death does himself no good and is likely to be disruptive and distressing to those still living, maybe there has been selection to make people acquiesce (as an act of kin altruism).

And one more point. I’d say that to make the apostosis programme acceptable to the public, it would help if it were dressed up with a bit of ritual mumbo jumbo. Perhaps it should be made out to tie in with the rhythms of nature. One way of doing this would be to introduce a symmetry beween birth and death by having the warning of death come not ten minutes but nine months before the due time. The doomed person would then go through a period that could be celebrated as “anti-gestation.” (No doubt there would soon be self-help manuals available, along the lines of “What to expect when you’re expecting”.)

Dennett’s provocative proposal pushes us toward a deeper understanding of end-of-life decision-making, the significance of death, and personal liberty.

As a matter of social policy, we could make the action of whole-body apoptosis (WBA) either mandatory or voluntary, i.e., either forcing people to submit to, or letting them voluntarily submit to, the appropriate physical requirements such that WBA occurs in the designated period later in their lives. Mandatory WBA appears to be Dennett’s proposal (what he calls ‘Whole-body apoptosis 1.0’). I suggest that both options raise important problems. However, mandatory WBA has the distinct problem of restricting individual liberty whereas voluntary WBA enhances liberty, specifically liberty regarding end-of-life decision-making. So, if we were to accept one of these, I suggest voluntary WBA (call it Whole-Body Apoptosis 2.0). First I will address some general problems for both mandatory and voluntary WBA. Second, I will address the question of liberty in relation to WBA and euthanasia (the relationship between euthanasia and WBA is alluded to in comments by both Hedonic Treader and Stevan Harnad).

Regarding general problems for both mandatory and voluntary WBA, the apoptosis event could occur at a very inopportune moment in the five-year span, causing the subject to incur great loss of potential value to herself or others (perhaps a missed moment of self-discovery, or other activities that Dennett alludes to such as finishing writing a novel). Our futures are full of opportunities, and WBA could cut nearly five years out. It is all the more devastating to know that it did not have to be this way. Furthermore, the apoptosis event could be quite dangerous, if one were engaged in actions in which others’ well-being or very lives depended on the subject (e.g., driving, spotting someone lifting weights). In the “Coda” section, Dennett amends the view so that the subject has a ten-minute warning. But this might be insufficient if one is driving a long, narrow road in the mountains with no pull-outs, for instance. Perhaps it should be fifteen minutes, or an hour, but extending the warning period seems to defy the point of WBA. People could refrain from all such potentially dangerous actions, but thereby diminish freedom and valuable opportunities. (Note that the same possibly dangerous outcomes exist in a non-WBA situation; but in a WBA situation, there is one more chance of this happening, and the subject knows it will occur at some point in that five-year span.)

An emotional cost also comes with either mandatory WBA or voluntary WBA. A designated time period for the apoptosis event precludes the (biological) possibility of living beyond that period. But, for some individuals at least, the possibility of personal immortality, in whatever form or fashion one dreams of (even if extremely unlikely), or persisting beyond one’s ‘allotted time’, generates hope: the hope of future opportunities, completing projects, etc. This possibility and the hope it generates partially drives some people to push on, thus yielding more value for the self or others.

Regarding the question of liberty, mandatory WBA clearly curtails individual liberty, foremost on the question of whether or not to die by WBA. But a policy allowing voluntary WBA enhances personal liberty. Version 2.0 of WBA makes this one of several voluntary ending-of-life options. But, as other commentators have mentioned, why not advocate for rights to engage in voluntary active euthanasia instead? Voluntary active euthanasia (‘active’ referring to a direct action that kills the subject, such as the injection of a lethal chemical), is safer for others (preventing the potentially dangerous outcomes mentioned above), less shocking (in the moment) to others, maximizes self-control capacities, and maximizes opportunities to engage in valuable activities.

Both voluntary active euthanasia and WBA are exercises of personal liberty and control over one’s well-being, yet convincing society to adopt voluntary WBA as morally permissible seems more difficult than convincing society that voluntary active euthanasia is permissible, a belief that has substantial traction already. Voluntary active euthanasia at least gives a person additional opportunities for valuable experiences before the time of death while equally diminishing the suffering (if carried out at the right time). Granted, the burden of decision-making for voluntary active euthanasia remains, but the emotional cost of this burden may seem insignificant to some individuals compared to the benefit of additional opportunities and experiences that voluntary WBA may erase.

DD: “…which would you prefer for your last months on earth: being struck by lightning at some point before you began losing your faculties, or an indefinitely long period of decline, during which you would gradually become unable to perform the simple actions of life and participate meaningfully in conversation or decision-making?”

More options: How about choosing the moment on the fly, based on your condition and prognosis in real time? Or pre-specifying the objective medical criteria on the basis of which you would like it to be decided when the euthanasia should to be done (while you’re asleep)? (But wouldn’t many people prefer to be able to say goodbye?)

DD: “We could arrange to have a human body switch itself off quite abruptly and painlessly at a time to be determined. ”

Why apoptosis? Nocturnal barbiturate administration would do the trick, if the criteria were objective and reliably (and verifiably) followed. (Apoptosis just adds a needless further layer of sci-fi on the problem, which is merely to determine when the euthanasia should take place. Surely it’s better to make that that decision an objective criterion-based one rather than simply an a-priori time-based one?)

DD: “Almost nobody would want to know to a near certainty the exact day and hour of their death, and the reasons why are made vivid in any number of death-row dramas. ”

Are death-row inmates (whether guilty or innocent) representative of the rest of humanity? Surely there are many people and reasons for wanting to know when. And even if one does not know, the question is whether the cut-off should be actuarial clock-triggered or substantive criterion-triggered. (Determining the right criterion – or, for that matter, the right chronometry – are another matter, and that’s probably where the real substantive issues reside.)

DD: “We install in every human being and in every subsequent human embryo a system that ensures the swift, painless death at some randomly determined time between the age of 85 and 90… ”

Why between 85 and 90, or between any t1 and t2? Is the idea that the interval is an absolute, universal one, that fits all of humankind? If not, then surely it is what other factors (e.g., health, performance capacity, desire to stay alive…) determine the individuals’ time-window that matter far more than keeping the moment within the time-window unpredictable.

DD: “How do we balance the increase of suffering against the non-suffering lives of a few?”

By basing the euthanasia point on individual, objective criteria, not a-priori timing.

DD: “If you would prefer to die by lightning bolt while you are still effective and healthy, the price you must be willing to pay is foregoing some years or months that would have been just as effective and healthy as your last days.”

There’s decline and there’s decline. Some people would put up with some bodily deterioration as long as they remained mentally sharp. None of these things is predictable, for an individual, from a-priori timing alone. That’s just population statistics, and if we’re to be treated according to those, then we may as well not see doctors when we are ill: just type in our age and symptoms, or perhaps just our age (so we can be treated automatically for its most common illness)!

DD: “…just because we could arrange to live to be 100 (or 120!) we really have no right to use up so much more than our fair share of the world’s resources and amenities.”

If we are to reason along those lines, it’s not just our right to live out our years that must be subordinated to the rest of the planet’s needs, but what we have a right to whilst we’re alive (and others are wanting). There’s much to be said for (and against) thinking along these general lines, but it has another name than euthanasia or apoptosis. And the management of how long people are entitled to live will be far less consequential than the management of other entitlements (such as wealth, property, reproduction rights, and perhaps even how we spend our days and use our capacities).

DD: “One of the most interesting objections I have provoked in recent discussions is the suggestion that this policy, if adopted, would rob us of precious opportunities to prove our strength by enduring suffering.”

That objection conflates the question of euthanasia itself with pre-timed pop-off. And it is an example of one of the most sordid and sociopathic justifications for withholding euthanasia (reminiscent of an equally noxious credally based one): Let them suffer for the good of their souls (and mine).

Well, fine, in the cases where “their” and “mine” are co-referential. (In other words, where I’m the one who decides I’d rather stick around and suffer.) But that’s the luxury problem, while there are so many who would rather not stay around and suffer, but are not allowed or able to do anything about it.

DD: “…we could use technology to fine-tune the system, to monitor various plausible measures of quality of life in both individuals and populations, so that apoptosis could more optimally track actual mean rates of decline or even rates of decline in individuals so that apoptosis could be customized in any of a dozen ways.”

Better still, once we’ve figured out a better way of “customizing” the hour, forget about the apoptosis and just use nocturnally administered barbiturates…

DD: “We should pause to take seriously — very seriously — the prospect of protecting some aspects of our lives and deaths from management, and thereby reframing our landscape of decisions.”

And actuarially pre-planned apoptotic obsolescence is a protection from management?

DD: “Why should we devote so much of our R&D budget to finding ways of extending life?”

That’s an entirely different matter, completely independent of pre-planned obsolescence.

DD: “…the prospect of being able to live out your remaining days relatively confident that your survivors will not have to set aside memories of a pathetic decline in order to get to the memories of you that matter. What would you trade for that? I’d trade any number of years over 85…(I am 65 as I write this). ”

Any updates on this view, now that another half-decade has gone by? The criteria for such decisions are of course personal matters, but I, for one, think the world would be far, far better off with Dan Dennetts staying around as long as they are compos mentis, than by doing them at an appointed age so as to stretch strained old-age pensions one epsilon further. If we’re going to contemplate sci-fi fantasies, looking for a way to engineer apoptosis for pre-programmed death seems to me far less to the point than looking for a way to convince people to limit reproduction, become vegans, and convert to a sustainable way of living.

But Dan’s essay can also be taken to be addressing a far more important and urgent matter than pre-programmed pop-off, namely, euthanasia itself. The worst thing about the status quo on death now is the fact that most people cannot choose to die, even when they wish to. Surely before we can have consensus on pre-programmed pop-off for all (whether or not they want it) we must first agree to allow those who do want to die, now, to do so. Yes, there are complications and risks of abuse that need to be taken carefully into account, but the current status quo is cruel, unjust, and irrational.

Compassion and Complacency, Sympathy and Sociopathy

Laws are rational base-camps on the slippery slopes of life

Sociopathic Sanctimony

As far as human genetic engineering is concerned, it seems there are more relevant applications. Why not reduce the average human pain sensitivity by 20-30% and/or increase average happiness respectively to make life better during the 80 or so years it’s going to last? (for a long-term vision, compare http://www.hedweb.com/abolitionist-project/index.html)

It is also worth pointing out that a genetic time bomb may be very unpleasant for those born with it if effective longevity solutions are discovered during their time, especially if the time bomb can’t be switched off…