However, I do not see that this is morally problematic. It seems to be a variation on a familiar feature of ethics. Consider, for example, a basic non-enhancement case in which a finite set of goods is to be distributed. Each person is due a fair share, but how large the share is depends upon how much there is to be distributed and how many recipients there are (i.e. how many entities have the moral status in virtue of which they need to be considered in the allocation). More people means a lesser share, but it does not follow from this that there is anything morally problematic merely with bringing about a situation in which people get a lesser share (e.g. by reducing resource output or growing the population). It may be that people want to preserve the size of their share and take steps to do so, which is fine, so long as they do not do so in ways that disregard the status of others (e.g. exclude some people who ought to be included in the distribution). Still, it would not be morally problematic merely to bring about others whose existence would reduce the shares of existing people. The enhancement situation you describe is similar. An implication of robust human enhancement might be that, under some circumstances, appropriate treatment of non-enhanced humans might change, and for this reason it might be that people do not want to pursue it or even take steps to discourage it. But it does not follow from this that if it were to occur it would be morally problematic or that it would undermine the moral status of non-enhanced people. The presence of robustly enhanced humans would (appropriately) change the treatment that is due non-enhanced humans (under some circumstances), just as the presence of more people does so in the non-enhancement case. What is morally problematic, whether it involves enhanced individuals or not, is to intentionally bring about a situation (either by creating demands or reducing resources) in which it is necessary to sacrifice some morally considerable individuals for others.

Wendell, some of your comments also concern treatment. Suppose there are enhanced chimps or bonobos such that they have autonomy related rights. The question then becomes how do we treat them in ways that are respectful of those rights? As you point out, this gives rise to quite difficult epistemological issues—e.g. How do we figure out what appropriate treatment amounts to?—as well as institutional issues—e.g. Who is responsible for determining it? You suggest toward the end of your comments that these problems could be sufficiently difficult that (as in the experiment case in the original post) it might be better not to perform the enhancements at all, since they are likely to lead to mistreatment. It seems to me (though what I am saying here is tentative) that there is some reason for optimism that in many cases we could determine and execute appropriate treatment. Take, for example, the enhanced chimp or bonobo case. We already are able to determine what is good and bad for non-human primates and have (in many contexts) extended them legal protections based on their moral status. We should be able to communicate still more effectively with robustly enhanced chimps and bonobos, and so be better able to determine their desires and what is good and bad for them—i.e. appropriate treatment.

Other of your cases—e.g. the teenager case and the parole case—also concerns institutional treatment of enhanced individuals (though not necessarily status enhanced). I agree that there are real challenges for institutions in determining how to treat enhanced individuals; but, as you say, there are already institutional contexts in which decisions are made on the basis of the capacities of individuals. Widespread enhancement might increase the need for capacity oriented evaluation (rather than age-oriented evaluation as in the case of voting, for example).

Matt, I agree that it is not at all obvious what an additional form of consideration would be, but something like deference on the basis of far superior wisdom and moral sensitivity is a good candidate. It is actually much easier (for me at least) to see how robust technological alteration could result in diminished moral status. Several forms of consideration are due to people because they are vulnerable and limited in certain ways. If a person were enhanced such that she no longer had the relevant vulnerabilities or dependencies, then she would not be due the same consideration. Cases such as this, where technological enhancement increases capabilities but leads to less consideration (loss of a type of status), raise questions that have not addressed here—e.g. whether it can be good, desirable or right to alter people in ways that diminish their moral status?

Gerry, thank you for the pointer to Sawyer’s novels, which I look forward to reading.

Perhaps one possibility is that of enhancements that enable much greater levels of empathy, compassion, and so forth, leading to the creation of something like “moral sages.” And perhaps the novel thing that might be owed to them (by us normals) could be something like deference (i.e. in moral decision-making)? (I borrow the idea of enhancing capacity for compassion from a talk given by Thomas Magnell at the 2010 Conference on Value Inquiry.) Something like that?

Your essay reminded me of the classic story Flowers for Algernon (1958), which was made into the movie Charly (1968). Charlie Gordon’s moral status certainly goes up and down as he develops greater capabilities and than reverts back to his older self. How might we consider this kind of enhancement in relationship to a great ape. Research funding would get the initial bonobo or chimp educational experiences that demonstrated heightened acumen. But what about the second and third or five hundredth bonobo enhanced. Could well-intentioned advocates sue on her behalf to get the education that would allow the bonobo to realize her potential? The answer to the question might very well depend on whether the courts perceive potential as enhanced moral status. Certainly there will be changing perceptions on questions like this over time. For example, in Buck v. Bell (1927), Wendell Holmes felt free to argue for compulsory sterilization based on future potential, while today we consider such eugenic claims as unacceptable.

This leads us to your fourth point. Would a court be obligated to educate the bonobo so that she could appreciate what informed consent means, and thus be able to consent or not consent in regards to further enhancement or further education. As you point out, this all gets convoluted enough that it brings into question whether enhanced moral status raises unresolvable issues.

Sawyer posits coming into existence of a self-aware being that arises from the operation of the Internet, (dubbed Webmind) which/who then interacts with humanity and comes to see its/his role as endeavoring to facilitate good for the greatest number of humans.

Sawyer also produces a subplot in which a hybrid chimpanzee-bonobo named Hobo is taught to communicate via sign language and comes to create representational paintings. Some propose to sterilize Hobo to avoid blurring the species lines between bonobos and chimps. But in the end, Hobo takes the opportunity to express his choice publicly, which is adopted due to some clever action by the humans caring for him.

(Sawyer brings the two plot lines together when Webmind chooses Hobo to serve as his avatar while addressing the United Nations.)

“Some ethicists have argued that robust human enhancement is problematic on the grounds that it would diminish or undermine the moral status of non-enhanced humans. However, on a capacities view of moral status, creating robustly enhanced humans does not itself undermine the moral status (e.g. rights or dignity) of non-enhanced humans, since, so long as they have the same capacities and types of relationships they have always had, they will have the same moral status.”

I wonder if a variation of the worry remains. Compare a case where many or most chickens are enhanced such that they have the capabilities – and corresponding moral status – of a typical chimpanzee. While the remaining ordinary chickens have the same status as always, they are now at a status below that of their peers. Notice that many people would hold that in distributing scarce goods, etc., that priority should be given to those with greater moral status. For example, if we can either only feed a chimpanzee or only feed an oyster, we should feed the chimpanzee. Given the current case then, it seems like the ordinary, non-enhanced chickens do have grounds to worry, and to see their status as diminished relative to that of others (even if their moral status remains unchanged). Similarly then, could the moral status of ordinary humans be undermined relative to the higher status of robustly enhanced humans in a way that would make such enhancements morally problematic (even if the moral status of ordinary humans remains the same, strictly speaking)?