To perfect society, it is necessary to develop the faculties, intellectual and moral, with which man is endowed. But the main spring to their development, and, through this, to progress, improvement and civilization, with all their blessings, is the desire of individuals to better their condition. For, this purpose, liberty and security are indispensable. Liberty leaves each free to pursue the course he may deem best to promote his interest and happiness, as far as it may be compatible with the primary end for which government is ordained—while security gives assurance to each, that he shall not be deprived of the fruits of his exertions to better his condition. These combined, give to this desire the strongest impulse of which it is susceptible. For, to extend liberty beyond the limits assigned, would be to weaken the government and to render it incompetent to fulfill its primary end—the protection of society against dangers, internal and external. The effect of this would be, insecurity; and, of insecurity—to weaken the impulse of individuals to better their condition, and thereby retard progress and improvement. On the other hand, to extend the powers of the government, so as to contract the sphere assigned to liberty, would have the same effect, by disabling individuals in their efforts to better their condition.

Herein is to be found the principle which assigns to power and liberty their proper spheres, and reconciles each to the other under all circumstances. For, if power be necessary to secure to liberty the fruits of its exertions, liberty, in turn, repays power with interest, by increased population, wealth, and other advantages, which progress and improvement bestow on the community. By thus assigning to each its appropriate sphere, all conflicts between them cease; and each is made to co-operate with and assist the other, in fulfilling the great ends for which government is ordained.

*Paragraphs 80-95 of the 166-paragraph Disquisition.*
But the principle, applied to different communities, will assign to them different limits. It will assign a larger sphere to power and a more contracted one to liberty, or the reverse, according to circumstances. To the former, there must ever be allotted, under all circumstances, a sphere sufficiently large to protect the community against danger from without and violence and anarchy within. The residuum belongs to liberty. More cannot be safely or rightly allotted to it.

But some communities require a far greater amount of power than others to protect them against anarchy and external dangers; and, of course, the sphere of liberty in such, must be proportionally contracted. The causes calculated to enlarge the one and contract the other, are numerous and various. Some are physical—such as open and exposed frontiers, surrounded by powerful and hostile neighbors. Others are moral—such as the different degrees of intelligence, patriotism, and virtue among the mass of the community, and their experience and proficiency in the art of self-government. Of these, the moral are, by far, the most influential. A community may possess all the necessary moral qualifications, in so high a degree, as to be capable of self-government under the most adverse circumstances; while, on the other hand, another may be so sunk in ignorance and vice, as to be incapable of forming a conception of liberty, or of living, even when most favored by circumstances, under any other than an absolute and despotic government.

The principle, in all communities, according to these numerous and various causes, assigns to power and liberty their proper spheres. To allow to liberty, in any case, a sphere of action more extended than this assigns, would lead to anarchy; and this, probably, in the end, to a contraction instead of an enlargement of its sphere. Liberty, then, when forced on a people unfit for it, would, instead of a blessing, be a curse; as it would, in its reaction, lead directly to anarchy—the greatest of all curses. No people, indeed, can long enjoy more liberty than that to which their situation and advanced intelligence and morals fairly entitle them. If more than this be allowed, they must soon fall into confusion and disorder—to be followed, if not by anarchy and despotism, by a change to a form of government more simple and absolute; and, therefore, better suited to their condition. And hence, although it may be true, that a people may not have as much liberty as they are fairly entitled to, and are capable of enjoying—yet the reverse is questionably true—that no people can long possess more than they are fairly entitled to.

Liberty, indeed, though among the greatest of blessings, is not so great as that of protection; inasmuch, as the end of the former is the progress and improvement of the race—while that of the latter is its preservation and perpetuation. And hence, when the two come into
conflict, liberty must, and ever ought, to yield to protection; as the existence of the race is of
greater moment than its improvement.

It follows, from what has been stated, that it is a great and dangerous error to suppose that
all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a reward to be earned, not a blessing to be
gratuitously lavished on all alike—a reward reserved for the intelligent, the patriotic, the virtuous
and deserving—and not a boon to be bestowed on a people too ignorant, degraded and vicious, to
be capable either of appreciating or of enjoying it. Nor is it any disparagement to liberty, that
such is, and ought to be the case. On the contrary, its greatest praise—its proudest distinction is,
that an all-wise Providence has reserved it, as the noblest and highest reward for the development
of our faculties, moral and intellectual. A reward more appropriate than liberty could not be
conferred on the deserving—nor a punishment inflicted on the undeserving more just, than to be
subject to lawless and despotic rule. This dispensation seems to be the result of some fixed law—
and every effort to disturb or defeat it, by attempting to elevate a people in the scale of liberty,
above the point to which they are entitled to rise, must ever prove abortive, and end in
disappointment. The progress of a people rising from a lower to a higher point in the scale of
liberty, is necessarily slow—and by attempting to precipitate, we either retard, or permanently
defeat it.

There is another error, not less great and dangerous, usually associated with the one
which has just been considered. I refer to the opinion, that liberty and equality are so intimately
united, that liberty cannot be perfect without perfect equality. That they are united to a certain
extent—and that equality of citizens, in the eyes of the law, is essential to liberty in a popular
government, is conceded. But to go further, and make equality of condition essential to liberty,
would be to destroy both liberty and progress. The reason is, that inequality of condition, while it
is a necessary consequence of liberty, is, at the same time, indispensable to progress. In order to
understand why this is so, it is necessary to bear in mind, that the main spring to progress is, the
desire of individuals to better their condition; and that the strongest impulse which can be given
to it is, to leave individuals free to exert themselves in the manner they may deem best for that
purpose, as far at least as it can be done consistently with the ends for which government is
ordained—and to secure to all the fruits of their exertions. Now, as individuals differ greatly
from each other, in intelligence, sagacity, energy, perseverance, skill, habit of industry and
economy, physical power, position and opportunity—the necessary effect of leaving all free to
exert themselves to better their condition, must be a corresponding inequality between those who
may possess these qualities and advantages in a high degree, and those who may be deficient in
them. The only means by which this result can be prevented are, either to impose such
restrictions on the exertions of those who may possess them in a high degree, as will place them
on a level with those who do not; or to deprive them of the fruits of their exertions. But to
impose such restrictions on them would be destructive of liberty—while, to deprive them of the
fruits of their exertions, could be to destroy the desire of bettering their condition. It is, indeed,
his inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which
gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press
forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank back
to the rear, or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of the
government, would put an end to the impulse, and effectually arrest the march of progress.

These great and dangerous errors have their origin in the prevalent opinion that all men
are born free and equal—than which nothing can be more unfounded and false. It rests upon the
assumption of a fact, which is contrary to universal observation, in whatever light it may be
regarded. It is, indeed, difficult to explain how an opinion so destitute of all sound season, ever
could have been so extensively entertained, unless we regard it as being confounded with
another, which has some semblance of truth—but which, when properly understood, is not less
false and dangerous. I defer to the assertion, that all men are equal in the state of nature;
meaning, by a state of nature, a state of individuality, supposed to have existed prior to the social
and political state; and in which men lived apart and independent of each other. If such a state
ever did exist, all men would have been, indeed, free and equal in it; that is, free to do as they
pleased, and exempt from the authority or control of others—as, by supposition, it existed
anterior to society and government. But such a state is purely hypothetical. It never did, nor can
exist; as it is inconsistent with the preservation and perpetuation of the race. It is, therefore, a
great misnomer to call it the state of nature. Instead of being the natural state of man, it is, of all
conceivable states, the most opposed to his nature—most repugnant to his feelings, and most
incompatible with his wants. His natural state is, the social and political—the one for which his
Creator made him, and the only one in which he can preserve and perfect his race. As, then, there
never was such a state as the, so-called, state of nature, and never can be, it follows, that men,
instead of being born in it, are born in the social and political state; and of course, instead of
being born free and equal, are born subject, not only to parental authority, but to the laws and
institutions of the country where born, and under whose protection they draw their first breath. With these remarks, I return from this digression, to resume the thread of the discourse.

It follows, from all that has been said, that the more perfectly a government combines power and liberty—that is, the greater its power and the more enlarged and secure the liberty of individuals, the more perfectly it fulfills the ends for which government is ordained. To show, then, that the government of the concurrent majority is better calculated to fulfill them than that of the numerical, it is only necessary to explain why the former is better suited to combine a higher degree of power and a wider scope of liberty than the latter. I shall begin with the former.

The concurrent majority, then, is better suited to enlarge and secure the bounds of liberty, because it is better suited to prevent government from passing beyond its proper limits, and to restrict it to its primary end—the protection of the community. But in doing this, it leaves, necessarily, all beyond it open and free to individual exertions; and thus enlarges and secures the sphere of liberty to the greatest extent which the condition of the community will admit, as has been explained. The tendency of government to pass beyond its proper limits is what exposes liberty to danger, and renders it insecure; and it is the strong counteraction of governments of the concurrent majority to this tendency which makes them so favorable to liberty. On the contrary, those of the numerical, instead of opposing and counteracting this tendency, add to it increased strength, in consequence of the violent party struggles incident to them, as has been fully explained. And hence their encroachments on liberty, and the danger to which it is exposed under such governments.

So great, indeed, is the difference between the two in this respect, that liberty is little more than a name under all governments of the absolute form, including that of the numerical majority; and can only have a secure and durable existence under those of the concurrent or constitutional form. The latter, by giving to each portion of the community which may be unequally affected by its action, a negative on the others, prevents all partial or local legislation, and restricts its action to such measures as are designed for the protection and the good of the whole. In doing this, it secures, at the same time, the rights and liberty of the people, regarded individually; as each portion consists of those who, whatever may be the diversity of interests among themselves, have the same interest in reference to the action of the government.

Such being the case, the interest of each individual may be safely confided to the majority, or voice of his portion, against that of all others, and, of course, the government itself. It is only through an organism which vests each with a negative, in some one form or another,
that those who have like interests in preventing the government from passing beyond its proper
sphere, and encroaching on the rights and liberty of individuals, can cooperate peaceably and
effectually in resisting the encroachments of power, and thereby preserve their rights and liberty.
Individual resistance is too feeble, and the difficulty of concert and co-operation too great,
unaided by such an organism, to oppose, successfully, the organized power of government, with
all the means of the community at its disposal; especially in populous countries of great extent,
where concert and co-operation are almost impossible. Even when the oppression of the
government comes to be too great to be borne, and force is resorted to in order to overthrow it,
the result is rarely ever followed by the establishment of liberty. The force sufficient to
overthrow an oppressive government is usually sufficient to establish one equally, or more,
oppressive in its place. And hence, in no governments, except those that rest on the principle of
the concurrent or constitutional majority, can the people guard their liberty against power; and
hence, also, when lost, the great difficulty and uncertainty of regaining it by force.

It may be further affirmed, that, being more favorable to the enlargement and security of
liberty, governments of the concurrent, must necessarily be more favorable to progress,
development, improvement, and civilization—and, of course, to the increase of power which
results from, and depends on these, than those of the numerical majority. [Disquisition continues]