


# Ideas

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FROM THE NATIONAL HUMANITIES CENTER

**Refracted Visions:**  
**Looking at the World after September 11**  
*Collected Essays*



# Refracted Visions:

Looking at the World  
after September 11

# Refracted Visions:

## Looking at the World after September 11

On September 11, 2001, as the magnitude of what had happened became apparent, all the convictions that I woke with earlier that morning shifted dramatically: my assumptions, both conscious and subconscious, were suddenly visible and profoundly inadequate. My experience is far from unique. In a discussion that took place in November 2001 at the National Humanities Center, one of the panelists argued that the humanities are characterized by their ability to be self-reflective and self-critical. Another pointed to the fragility of American society in the face of terrorism. This fragility has manifested itself, it seems to me, in the loss of that capacity for self-reflection. In the atmosphere of President Bush's statement that "You're either for us or against us," both off and, sadly, on campus, as at my own institution, open discussion has been met with hostile national attention and allegations of anti-Americanism.

It is, however, our task as humanists and as teachers to put events such as those of September 11 into a larger context, to interpret them for our students, our communities, and for society as a whole, to engage in the sort of self-reflection that characterizes what we as humanists do. It is also our task to bring our society to a thoughtful assessment, not only of the world around us, but also of ourselves, of our own actions and assumptions. The essays that follow all strive to do this, although in very different ways: they explore the ability of the photograph to both encompass and distance that which our eyes and

minds cannot grasp (Hirsch) and portray the fallen Twin Towers as symbols of American enterprise and freedom (Petroski) and of a religious, anticapitalist iconoclasm (Van Kley). They assert the importance of quotidian life, whether because of its transience and insecurity (Marty and Reed), its goodness (Elshtain), or its unseen violence (Scheper-Hughes). They argue that our war against terrorism is a just one (Elshtain) and that the events of September 11 have moved us to transcend regionalism (Reed). They urge reassessment of ourselves (Scheper-Hughes), our definitions of terrorism (Bush), and the relative importance of history and patriotic myth (Conrad). They emphasize the inhumanity of the terrorists (Elshtain), argue for a profound difference between Christianity and Islam (Van Kley), and attempt to make their actions comprehensible within the complexities of the Islamic world (Ahmed). Although these essays vary greatly, they share a seriousness of approach and thoughtful response and a willingness to reconsider previously held convictions.

Even in the best of times, self-reflection is inevitably painful and, as every teacher knows, can cause anger and resentment. Perhaps what we can offer to our students at points of crisis like this is our own willingness to listen carefully and seriously to one another, to meet each other's efforts with goodwill and generosity of spirit, to be willing both to acknowledge dissent and to learn from it. Let us listen to one another.

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"Woman at the Window, September 11, 2001."

Photograph by Eric Nederlander. Available through *Here Is New York* ([www.hereisnewyork.org](http://www.hereisnewyork.org)).

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## America Joins the Human Race

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Insofar as I identify myself as a historian of culture, I find myself looking for some things other than I would or do when reporting or engaging in social analysis. The “culture” text that moved me most for interpreting is from José Ortega y Gasset. I’ll paraphrase: real history is made less by wars, cataclysms, or ingenious inventions than when the sensitive crown of the human heart inclines, for example, from pessimism to optimism or from heroism to utility. The sensitive crown of the American heart, insofar as there is any sort of collective one, has inclined from a sense of security to insecurity. One reads this on the faces of the most powerful people in this nation that is reduced to near-powerlessness in its efforts to “stamp out” terrorism. One hears it in the voices of the people down the block, or sees it on the face in one’s own mirror.

The move from the illusion of security, or apparent security, or even true security as measured by nations with enemies, does not

mean the end of everything. It means that we have “joined the human race.” Most people in history, whether they live on the slopes of volcanoes or above geological faults; whether they are living at the mercy of the feudal lord in his castle up the hill or facing vandals and marauders; whether they are in economically dire circumstances—and most people are in situations like these—somehow endured. They were born and grew up and made love and raised children and ate and drank and fashioned art and did their day’s work, often with caution or, a sense of foreboding, but they went about all that.

While Americans and allies face the terrorists and try to keep coalitions together for a hoped-for day of rebuilding, it strikes me as important that, though we remain necessarily alert, we also have quotidian lives to live. The apostle Paul in First Corinthians Seven talks about how, in insecure and dire times, people should “mourn” as if not mourning, should “rejoice” as if not rejoicing, even live in marriage “as if” not—I’d need a few paragraphs to enlarge on that third one!—and living “as if not” may well be a way to permit the combination of commitment and detachment that might serve us well tomorrow.

## A Southern View of September 11

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**John Shelton Reed** is William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, past director of the Howard Odum Institute for Research in Social Science, coeditor of *Southern Cultures*, and presently is a visiting scholar at the Institute of United States Studies, University of London. He was a Fellow at the National Humanities Center in 1983–84.

I don't think there is a specifically "Southern" perspective on the terrorist attacks of September 11, but I presume that my late friend C. Vann Woodward would have disagreed. In a well-known essay, "The Irony of Southern History," Woodward argued that Southerners have been inoculated by history against the prevailing American myths of innocence and invincibility. Complicity in oppression, defeat in war, occupation by the enemy, seemingly ineradicable problems of poverty—Woodward pointed out that all of these experiences, though well-nigh universal elsewhere, have been seen in America to be Southern ones. And Southerners, he argued, have learned some valuable lessons from them: that not everyone admires us and wishes us well, that we cannot always bend the world to our will, that history isn't just something that happens to other, less fortunate people. (He was writing about white Southerners, but surely the history of black Southerners could have taught the same lessons.)

No doubt Woodward was correct about some of the more thoughtful Southerners of his generation—about himself, certainly, and many of the best of the South's poets, novelists, and historians. Some may still illustrate his thesis: right after the attacks, for example, novelist Alan Gurganus wrote movingly in *The New Yorker* about growing up among the ruins left by Sherman's army in eastern North Carolina. But I've always been skeptical about how deeply those lessons have penetrated. I fear they may have to be learned anew—if they're learned at all—by each generation. The Southerners I know best are mostly from

the burgeoning middle-class South of *Southern Living* readers, and they don't dwell much on the unhappier aspects of history. They were caricatured by Walker Percy in *The Last Gentleman* as "happy, victorious, Christian, rich, patriotic and Republican." Percy went on:

The happiness of the South was very formidable. It was an almost invincible happiness. It defied you to call it anything else. Everyone was in fact happy. The women were beautiful and charming. The men were healthy and successful and funny; they knew how to tell stories. They had everything the North had and more. They had a history, they had a place redolent with memories, they had good conversation, they believed in God and defended the Constitution, and they were getting rich in the bargain. They had the best of victory and defeat. Their happiness was aggressive and irresistible.... Oh, they were formidable, born winners (how did they lose?).

An exaggeration, to be sure, but closer, I suspect, to the statistical norm of the late twentieth-century South than Woodward's chastened realists. And whether we Southerners are actually happy or not, it seems to me that of late we've shared fully in the national belief that we *should* be happy, that Americans have a *right* to be happy—not just to pursue happiness but to catch it.

Consequently, as the public-opinion poll data suggest, Southerners were at least as outraged, as shocked, as *offended* by September 11 as were the rest of their countrymen. And Southerners are even more ready than other Americans to make someone *pay* for that offense (fair enough, since as usual Southerners will be doing more than their share of the fighting). But it's significant that we have responded not as Southerners, but as Americans.

Consider the story of the South Carolina middle-school students who have raised \$354,000 to buy a truck for a Brooklyn firehouse that lost one (along with seven firefighters) at the World Trade Center. After the fund-raising drive began, it came to light that some New York City firemen, former Union soldiers, had raised money in 1867 to buy a firetruck for Columbia, largely destroyed in the closing days of the Civil War, and that grateful citizens of Columbia had promised to help New York if the need arose. The South Carolina youngsters were pleased to learn that, of course, and the historical coincidence got them on national television. But they hadn't acted to fulfill a historical pledge. They didn't even know about it. They had responded simply out of compassion for their fellow Americans—who just happened to live in New York.

No, for the time being at least, what part of the country you're from has been irrelevant. A Texan interviewed on a network newscast shortly after the attacks spoke for most Southerners, I think, when he said something like, "We're all Americans. Being a Texan or New Yorker just isn't very important right now."

*[The towers, the Port Authority, the architect, or the structural engineer should not be blamed]. Terrorists alone are to blame for doing the unthinkable, the inconceivable, the irrational, the illogical, the evil.*

HENRY PETROSKI

## After the Fall

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**Henry Petroski** is the A. S. Vesic Professor of Civil Engineering and a professor of history at Duke University. He is a member of the National Humanities Center Class of 1987–88 and the author of *To Engineer Is Human*, *The Pencil*, and other books on engineering and design. His latest book, *Paperboy*, is a memoir of growing up in the nineteen-fifties and the cultural factors that drew him to engineering.

The Twin Towers of the New York World Trade Center were not beloved by architecture critics, who considered the prismatic megastructures more geometry than art. Even those few critics who, like Ada Louise Huxtable, first embraced the pair came to see them as intrusions into the cityscape of lower Manhattan and as out-of-scale protrusions from a more urbane skyline. Buildings were expected to acknowledge, not ignore, their predecessors. For more than a century, building upward had been done with a nod to tradition and fashion. The towers of the Brooklyn Bridge and the Woolworth Building echoed the Gothic; the lines of the Chrysler and Empire State Buildings carried Art Deco to new heights. The World Trade Center's towers looked as though they had been extruded from the landfill that displaced the Hudson River, or so the critics would have us believe. Alone among professionals, engineers seemed to admire the towers—especially for the structural ingenuity that enabled them to withstand their own great weight and the force of the wind over New York Harbor.

Tourists took the World Trade Center towers on their own terms. For a brief time, they were simply the tallest buildings on earth, and so something to see and visit. Even when Chicago's Sears Tower surpassed them, the Twin Towers remained the tallest buildings in New York City. It was not lost on visitors that they had to take two elevators to reach the uppermost floors of the buildings. It was not lost on souvenir shop owners that the Twin Towers had become as much the primary icon of New York City as the Golden Gate Bridge

was of San Francisco. It was not lost on tour boat operators that, as their crafts sailed slowly around lower Manhattan, the World Trade Center towers seemed to be the focal point of most every photo, drawing attention away from even the Statue of Liberty.

Regardless of what the critics believed, the Twin Towers rewarded the eyes that looked upon them. The play of light and shadow on their aluminum and glass façades was ever changing under the transit of the sun. Their square shapes were anything but static to the uplifted head of the tourist or commuter who walked, sailed, or drove in their vicinity. The towers performed a silent pas de deux above the buildings massed around them, skyscrapers by any other standard reduced here to an audience seated at the towers' feet. Minoru Yamasaki's brilliance lay not in designing too tall buildings but in designing two tall buildings that danced as one. Everybody saw it but the critics.

It took their tragic collapse for the Twin Towers finally to be universally appreciated and acknowledged for what they were: sym-

bols of New York and America and free enterprise and democracy. They were admired for their ability to take the blows of madman-guided missiles and to stand long enough that most of their occupants could flee to safety. The towers themselves were not blamed for standing out in the skyline. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was not blamed for daring to undertake such a great project. The architect was not blamed for designing targets in the sky. The structural engineer was not blamed for the ultimate collapse.

Terrorists alone are to blame for doing the unthinkable, the inconceivable, the irrational, the illogical, the evil. Terrorists have changed forever the way we look at and think about super-tall buildings. Skyscrapers such as the New York World Trade Center Twin Towers will not likely be built again in our lifetimes, not because we cannot make them stronger and safer—and taller—but because we cannot fathom the nihilistic turn of mind that would wish to bring them down.



*[E]very picture prompts us to relive, not just to remember, the moment of the disaster. The single still frame provides a means by which to replay and also to attempt to master the trauma of September 11.*

MARIANNE HIRSCH

## September 11, 2001: Picturing Time

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**Marianne Hirsch** is a professor of French and Italian and of comparative literature at Dartmouth College. She was a Rockefeller Fellow at the Center in 1992–93, where her research project was titled “Family Pictures: Photography and Narratives of Loss.”

The first eyewitness I heard interviewed on television on the morning of the eleventh, a tourist with a heavy German accent, described seeing a plane fly into World Trade Center Tower 1 and exclaimed, “And would you believe it? My camera didn’t work! I tried to snap and nothing happened!” His voice expressed the frustration and also the embarrassment of thinking about wanting to take pictures at such a moment.

To photograph is to look in a different way—to look without understanding. Understanding is deferred until we see the developed image. This deferral is inherent to photography and to trauma, and thus photography may be best suited to help us understand the events of September 11. Indeed, in the days and months following the attacks of September 11, we have seen a proliferation of photojournalistic and amateur images, published in magazines and collected in exhibitions and books. It is an event that needs to be seen, and the deferral inherent to the photograph enables us not only to see the event and its aftermath, but also to experience an essential element of the attacks: the ways in which time expanded from the instant of the attack to its infinite repercussions and the way in which comprehension was deferred. The now of the photographic image is composed of layers of interconnected moments, and this is nowhere as apparent as in the images of what we call September 11—a moment that has expanded backward and forward into durational time.

The photojournalists who have been interviewed since September all comment on this incongruous temporality. One photographer injured during the collapse was surprised to

see the images he had taken of the explosion after the first plane hit printed in the *New York Daily News* with his byline. He could not remember taking the pictures. Another said she did not know where she had been on that day until she was able to look at her prints. A third reported that the lab technician called to ask him if he knew what was visible in one of his pictures of the exploding tower—a person clinging to a piece of the building. He had not seen that as he was shooting. Here is an example of what Walter Benjamin called the camera’s “optical unconscious”: the technologies of sight reveal more than we can see through the eye, but the realization of that supplemental revelation is deferred.

This may be why the camera offers not only a vehicle with which to see the sight of trauma, but also a form of protection and distancing: “When I couldn’t photograph, I really had to look,” says the photographer Lorie Novak of her thwarted effort to take pictures of the search/memorial walls at the New York Family Center. The pictures she took from a distance inscribe the metal barrier separating her from the posters of the missing: the barrier is a figure for the inherently distancing camera. Thus, time and space work the same way in the photograph: they expand, allowing both distance and deferral, even as they contract to get closer to the moment, the sight itself.

One might say that every picture prompts us to relive, not just to remember, the moment of the disaster. The single still frame provides a means by which to replay and also to attempt to master the trauma of September 11. It provides, most of all, a sense of the contradiction between the unchanging unrelenting passage of time moving forward, and the sense provided by September 11, that time stopped, that a new era has begun, that there is no going back.

## An Instance of Iconoclasm

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**Dale K. Van Kley** teaches in the Department of History at The Ohio State University and in 1989–90 was an Andrew W. Mellon Fellow at the National Humanities Center, where he wrote much of the manuscript for what was later published as *The Religious Origins of the French Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1996). He prepared this essay while taking up residence as a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow at the Newberry Library in Chicago.

The news of the horrific events of September 11 overtook me six hours after they occurred, in Paris, where I had arrived two days earlier, jauntily donning a Yankees cap as I proceeded through customs. I had decided to spend a week or so in Paris on my way to a one-term residency as a visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. My plan was to do a little research at, among other places, a small private archive-library specializing in the history of Jansenism called the Bibliothèque de Port-Royal. As it happened, it was there at about four in the afternoon that for the only two readers in the library at the time—myself and an American graduate student in French literature—the silent communion with the French Old Regime was shattered by the twenty-first century when the librarian whispered to us that events were taking place in our country of which we should probably be aware. Whereupon history stopped and stood still for the next twenty-four hours, as we tried to assimilate the unassimilable and tried mainly in vain to get in touch with those we loved at home.

When time again inevitably reimposed its obligations and routines, it was for me as a student of time long past, in particular the religious history of the French eighteenth century. What detained me in Paris at the time was the occurrence of one of the West's first antireligious popular riots, a small and little-noticed but precocious uprising against a Right-Bank parish's clergy in September 1789 early on in a revolution—the French Revolution, to be sure—that was to culminate

several years later in a campaign to “de-Christianize” France. Which is to say that what distracted me from the dreadful here and now was a backward glance on the transition from inter-religious to antireligious violence, a privileged moment perhaps in the “progressive” secularization of the West. That quest took me two days later to the French National Archives and a chance encounter with Barbara Diefendorf, a historian of the religious-civil wars between Protestants and Catholics in sixteenth-century France, to whom I suggested over lunch that, while she and I had been trying to recount the climax and end of the age of religious conflict in France, respectively, we might now be witnessing the advent of a new era of religious conflict after its long and, since the Enlightenment, supposedly definitive decline. She protested that, so far as Islam was involved, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon implicated at most a rogue and unrepresentative strain of the religion, and I could only agree. And yet there is something irreducibly religious about what happened on September 11, and it seems worth trying to say what that is.

Whatever else it may have been (undoubtedly very many things) and whatever brand of Islam was at work (a very moot point), the attack on the Twin Trade Towers and the Pentagon on September 11 was an act of spectacular iconoclasm, the targets having clearly been chosen as much for their symbolic value as for the number of victims they might yield. In contrast to the Christian cathedrals, whose lofty stature dominated Medieval Western towns in the name of the Lord, the tallest buildings in New York, and for a time the entire world, symbolized the supremacy of international trade and the global market. These international economic forces have tended to disintegrate religious commitments and the communities that they sustained into the value of consumption and a collection of consumers, at home as well as in the Middle

East, as well as to remodel even educational and religious institutions in the image of the profit-driven corporation. Further, there is no better symbol of the post-World War II military-industrial establishment than the Pentagon, whose persistence beyond the cold war is proof positive, if proof was needed, that its defense of the “free world” against the sometime Soviet Union and the threat of international communism were secondary all along to the purpose of maintaining the “stability” prerequisite to the flow of free trade. That the enemy had changed, that a highly politicized and newly militant version of Islam was to be a far more total opponent of capitalism than communism had ever been, should have been apparent as early as the

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DALE K. VAN KLEY

occasion of Islamic *jihad* against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80, coinciding as it did with the Iranian Revolution and the capture and captivity of the American Embassy staff in Tehran. In comparison and in retrospect, the conflict between free-market capitalism and communism looks increasingly like a family quarrel, one between two equally secular ideologies about means and not ends.

Religious iconoclasm has a long and reasonably respectable pedigree in the history of Christianity as well. In the case of revolutionary Calvinism, its most recent manifestation, the acts of iconoclasm were expressions of a heightened sense of divine transcendence

characteristic of the sixteenth-century as a whole. The destruction of religious images and whole edifices, the calculated desecration of the consecrated host in Corpus Christi processions—these and other characteristic gestures of sixteenth-century Protestant iconoclasm conveyed the religious meaning that such palpable and sensible helps to worship usurped and derogated from the veneration due to the incommensurate majesty of the divine creator and his revealed “word” alone. What most clearly reiterates this religious sense and sensibility in the recent history of the Taliban’s version of Islam is the Mullah Omar’s decree that the monumental Medieval Buddhas carved onto the face of Afghan cliffs be obliterated. The enormous figures were once, perhaps, the South Asian counterparts to the presidential busts carved into the face of the mountains in the Black Hills of South Dakota.

But Calvinism’s iconoclastic denial of the sacral quality of anything and everything beneath divine majesty above had the ironic effect of secularizing just about all of “creation” below. If, in Calvinistic logic, everything was equally and potentially religious if put to use in honor of the God to whom honor was alone due, then—in the long or secular run at least—nothing was especially religious either, eventually including transcendence itself. A further step in secularization was taken when the French Revolution directed its iconoclastic ire—revolutionary “vandalism,” in the abbé Grégoire’s coinage—against all the cultic objects of Christian worship as such, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish alike. If, further, any validity adheres to the German historian-sociologist Max Weber’s still powerful argument that Calvinism’s religious logic found expression in a kind of economic behavior giving birth to secular modernity in the form of industrial capitalism, then there is a crowning irony in that the architectural symbols of postindustrial capitalism should become the targets of religious iconoclasm in their turn. And if, finally, there

is anything to this convoluted line of thought, then history has just been invited to reverse its course, iconoclasm having targeted “soulless” secular symbols in order to effect a return toward a more sacral world.

For the Islamic side of this new divide, the question is whether Islam itself contains the potential for an indigenous or internal secularization—something akin to an Islamic Renaissance, Reformation, or even Enlightenment or French Revolution. Something at least that would be perceived as indigenously Islamic rather than an imposed importation from the West. I do not know the answer to this question; whereas during the cold war I had read *The Communist Manifesto*, much of Lenin, and part of *Das Kapital*, I confess that I have not yet read the *Koran* through and through. I only sense that, despite superficial similarities—iconoclasm, for one—there remain the most profound differences between all varieties of Islam on the one hand and all varieties of Christianity on the other. The question for the post-Christian West on the other side is rather whether at the public and diplomatic level we can draw on enough remaining religious capital to engage the Islamic world in something like overlapping if not congruous religious terms. A good starting point might be the quest for an Islamic counterpart to the disarming concept of grace—the gift of something for absolutely nothing—as opposed to “justice” in the sense of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth that seems to be advancing no worthy cause in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians today. In retrospect again, and in comparison, the conversation with communism looks easy.

What is clear is that it is not an especially good start in these circumstances to be told by our government that the very best way for its citizens to help is to go shopping.

## ***Jihad* against the West? The Perception of the “Enemy” in Islamic Fundamentalism**

**Rafiuddin Ahmed** was a Jesse Ball duPont Fellow at the National Humanities Center in 1999–2000 and was the author of “Islamic Debate on Europe in Colonial Bengal: *Jihad* against the ‘Infidels’?” which appeared in *Ideas*, volume 8, number 1. He is a professor of history at Elmira College and an adjunct professor of history at Cornell University.

As early as 1870, a group of prominent Indian Muslim theologians issued a *fatawa* (legal pronouncement) declaring that the Muslims of that country, though occupied by the British, were “protected by Christians” and that there can be no *jihad* “in a country where [such] protection is afforded.” The *fatawa*, which was part of a process of understanding and analyzing the causes of Muslim disaffection against the British rulers of India, was reported in a highly debated book, *The*



*Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound By Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen*, written by W. W. Hunter, an influential civil servant charged by the Governor General and Viceroy, Lord Mayo, with investigating the causes of Muslim anger. It stated that the “absence of protection and liberty between Musalmans and Infidels is essential in a religious war, and that condition does not exist there.” This opinion received further support from a decision by the “Law Doctors” of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, which stated that a “country of Islam does not become *Dar-ul-Harb* [a territory not under Islamic law, which, according to classical Muslim jurisprudence, should be made so, if necessary by force] as soon as it passes into the hands of the Infidels.”

Critical to an understanding of the two *fatawas* is their notion of *jihad* and the reference to the Europeans as “infidels.” Although *jihad* was considered inappropriate against the Christian rulers of India for the “protection” they offered to the Muslims, the situation under which the Muslims had to live was nevertheless not ideal: their country had been occupied by “infidels.” Perhaps, as the original *fatawa* stated, a *jihad* would have been the appropriate response if there were a “probability of victory to Musalman [sic].” “If there be no such probability, the *jihad* is unlawful.” Thus, the need for a *jihad* is not entirely dismissed; only the circumstances were not favorable to the Muslims. But who would have been the targets of this *jihad* if waged? Obviously, the target would have been the British colonial regime, not the European civilization that it represented.

Essentially, these *fatawas* were academic decisions and had little impact on Muslim public opinion, but they do reflect viewpoints widely shared by Muslims at that time. Lands that the Muslims considered their own domains, including the Indian subcontinent, had been occupied by the Europeans. Their laws were being tampered with and supplanted by European laws and regulations, their aristocracy had been humbled, and the *ulama*

(religious leadership) sidelined. Articulate Muslims were shocked and puzzled and were engaged in a searching, and often painful, debate on the nature of their relationship with the colonial rulers, who happened to be Christian; sometimes these discussions had violent consequences. Even when *jihad* was dismissed as an inappropriate option, the Muslim *ulama* had hardly any doubt about the religious implications of the conflict. The labeling of Europeans as infidels and the continued debate on *jihad* typify this attitude. There were others, more radical in their orientation—the so-called Islamic revivalists—who never accepted European presence as “lawful” and openly espoused *jihad*, although the support they enjoyed may have been small.

Thus, it is clear that there was a great deal of resentment against colonial conditions. The fact that the rulers were Christians was equally detestable. Yet, the revivalist/fundamentalist literature of the time hardly contains any reference to the struggle in terms of a Crusade-like *jihad*. Their response to the colonial regime, despite a pejorative labeling—namely, the infidels—was conditioned more by the turn in their fortunes and an internal discourse of decline and degeneration than by any deep-seated hostility toward Europe or Christianity. Their ultimate objective was to regain what was perceived to have been lost: power and glory. “Purification” of the faith was the key to achieving this goal, and this required them to fight both against the “un-Islamic” accretions to their religion as well as against those who had led the *umma* (the Islamic community) into this abyss.

Although the political context of the modern-day fundamentalist/radical Islamic movements is significantly different from that in the nineteenth or early twentieth century—in part because of the demise of Western colonialism and the consequent rise of secular-oriented nation-states—their ideological discourse continues to revolve around the twin questions of “authenticity” of the faith and the creation of an “ideal” Islamic order.

Despite efforts by the postcolonial secular states to marginalize the Islamic leadership, and their agenda, the latter soon began asserting their position, taking advantage, especially, of the weaknesses of the regimes and the social and economic discontent that their rule produced. The pressures they felt were more intense than in the colonial period, especially as they increasingly came into direct conflict with the state, led by people who themselves were Muslims. In the changed environment, violence became one of the principal means of pressure against the regimes as well as against those who opposed their agenda. This, however, did not occasion any fundamental change in their perception of the “enemy.” Their continued emphasis was on cleansing Islam from within.

*[For most Islamic fundamentalists]  
it is the “internal enemy”  
with whom they are  
principally concerned.  
They do not envisage conquering  
the non-Muslim West,  
only “purifying” their own homes,  
even if that means  
open confrontation with the West.*

RAFIUDDIN AHMED

To what extent this search for authenticity and an ideal Islamic order dictate the agenda of the fundamentalist movements in our time can be gleaned from the violent anti-Ahmadiya riots in the Pakistani province of Punjab in 1953, which were provoked by an unlikely alliance of the extremist sections of the conservative *ulama* and the fundamentalist Jama't-i-Islami. This small minority community, known as the Ahmadiyas, was made

the target of organized violence, costing the lives of scores of their numbers, principally because of disagreements over doctrinal matters. For the *ulama*-fundamentalist alliance, one of the core issues was to determine the parameters of “authentic” Islam. The Ahmadiyas, by disagreeing with the established interpretations of certain Islamic doctrines, especially the doctrine of the finality of prophethood (*Khatm-e-Nabuwwat*), argued their opponents, had effectively taken themselves out of the fold of Islam; however, the problem with such a rigid definition of doctrines was that no two Muslim theologians could agree on a common formula on what made a person a Muslim. Members of the Munir Commission (led by the chief justice of Pakistan’s supreme court), which was charged with investigating the causes of the violence, were equally puzzled. If “we adopt the definition given by any one of the *ulama*, we remain Muslims according to the view of that *alim*, but *kafirs* (infidels) according to the definition of everyone else,” they wrote.

The Ahmadiya question was critical to the extremist *ulama* and the fundamentalists because of both the doctrinal issues that it raised and, equally, the political advantages that it offered them. Marginalized by the secular state, they thought that the issue could help them redefine the scope of the state ideology by emphasizing the relevance of Islam in Muslim political culture. More important, it was an issue likely to embarrass the secular leadership and propel the Islamists into the limelight. The fight against the secular state was inevitable, and there could not have been an issue more emotive and powerful in mobilizing support in favor of the Islamists.

Secular Muslim elites clearly are their target. The elites are “deeply affected by the poisonous content and the thoroughly materialistic bias of modern secular education,” explained Maulana Maududi, the principal ideologue and founder of the fundamentalist Jama't-i-Islami. In *The Islamic Law and Its Introduction in Pakistan*, he severely castigat-

ed the elites for their “adoption of Western culture and civilization and aping the West even in the most personal things.” To him, *jihad* was the last option, but this *jihad* was more directed against the “internal” enemy and the oppressors than against any “civilizational” enemy. Despite his bitter criticisms of aspects of Western culture, he admired the scientific achievements of the West and never identified it as the common enemy of the Muslims.

Even Hasan al-Banna, the founder and ideologue of the radical *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (or Society of Muslim Brothers) in Egypt, argued in a similar vein on the need for reorienting the Muslim society to a “pure” Islamic order. Like Maududi, he was critical of Western cultural and ideological influence on Muslim societies, especially Egypt, and thought that the solution to their political, social, and economic problems “lay in a return to Islam as a comprehensive order for all aspects of human existence,” according to Ali Rehnema in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*. Al-Banna abhorred Western culture and Western influences, but his principal concern was with the “internal decay” of the Muslim societies.

The modern-day fundamentalist ideology not only emphasizes the creation of an “ideal” Islamic order, but also openly propagates the need for ousting the secular governments through revolutionary movements, if necessary. Without the control of political power, their ultimate objective of the ideal order would not be realized. Inevitably, this led to increased violence in many Muslim countries—especially between the state and the fundamentalists—in the postcolonial period. Much of the tension in those countries in recent years clearly demonstrates this trend.

What, then, is the responsibility of the West? Why are the fundamentalists so upset with the West? Or, are they? Relevant to these questions is the so-called theory of a “clash of civilizations” popularized by Bernard Lewis in his 1990 *Atlantic* article “The Roots of Muslim Rage” and Samuel Huntington in his heralded

(or derided, depending on one’s perspective) 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article “The Clash of Civilizations.” Wrote Lewis:


We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expression.

Lewis overemphasizes the ideological-cultural content of the present conflict unnecessarily by oversimplifying the historical-cultural relationships between Islam and the West. Obviously written with the Arab Muslims in mind, his field of expertise, he does not see that more than two-thirds of the world’s Muslims today are non-Arabs (the Afghans included) and are not heirs to that (Arab) civilization. He equally ignores the fact that fundamentalism is not uniquely an Islamic phenomenon. In fact, fundamentalist religious ideologies have flourished openly in many different societies in recent times, including Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. The Gush Emunim in Israel and the Viswa Hindu Parishad in India are typical examples. Many of these groups have openly advocated, and resorted to, violence to advance their political agenda.

Equally problematic is the labeling of the Muslims as an “ancient rival,” a sentiment that assumes the Muslim world to be a monolithic cultural unit. Samuel Huntington, for example, writes of the “bloody borders” of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc that extends from the bulge of Africa to Central Asia, effectively excluding more than half the Muslim population of the world who live in South and Southeast Asia and are not Arabs by any definition. Their social and cultural mores, attitudes, and perceptions differ widely from the Arabian Islamic traditions. Furthermore,

although the modern-day fundamentalist movements theoretically represent a shared response to Muslim problems worldwide, each movement is conditioned by the immediate realities it confronts.

To the extent the West is perceived as collaborating with an oppressive regime, like that of the Shah of Iran, or openly seen as opposing a rightful “Muslim” cause, such as the Palestinian issue, their anger turns against the former. There are also cultural questions that irritate many Muslims. Many see the West as a source of corruption and vulgarism and openly react against Western influences. Indeed, a sense of frustration pervades the minds of many in these countries over Western “intervention” in the Muslim world, especially the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, home to the holiest Islamic sites (a touchy subject, and one of the issues Osama bin Laden has capitalized upon), continued sanctions against Iraq, the role of the International Monetary Fund, and a host of other issues. Even the overbearing presence of Western “experts” in some of these countries is an irritant to many Muslims. Issues like the Palestinian struggle, the Kashmir conflict, and Western support for “tyrannical” regimes further embitter them about what they perceive to be the “unjust” role of the Western powers in world affairs. Memories of colonial conditions continue to haunt many minds and serve as a reminder of Western intentions. This attitude, however, is more directly related to the perceived sense of injustice than to any inherent prejudice and does not transform the tension into a Muslim-West divide. There may be isolated groups or individuals propagating the need for a *jihad* against the West, but the overwhelming fundamentalist perception of the “enemy” remains essentially unchanged: it is the “internal enemy” with whom they are principally concerned. They do not envisage conquering the non-Muslim West, only “purifying” their own homes, even if that means open confrontation with the West.



*[In the aftermath of September 11, my Constitutional law student] could not find any place in the American legal profession today for any proposition, historical or otherwise, that would have the practical effect of challenging any tenet of contemporary Constitutional faith.*

STEPHEN A. CONRAD

## Teaching the Law after September 11

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September 11 brought to my classroom questions that have surprised me—questions about professionalism, both in teaching and in law. As a historian teaching at a law school, I see myself as something of an outsider, and I presume academic license to give my students something other (more?) than (mere?) professional training. In the classroom, I make a point of using the study of history to challenge the authority of legalism, which I define as “an ethos of rule following.” Such challenges in law school classrooms are hardly uncommon; many, if not most, law professors claim to pose them, at least as heuristics.

In the fall 2001 semester, however, I was taken aback when students in my constitutional history seminar began responding to some of the old challenges in ways that were new to me. For example, one afternoon in mid-November, Michael H. announced to the class that he had decided to reject a proposition that earlier in the semester we all had taken to be eminently justified by the historical record: that the “original” framing and ratification of the United States Constitution did not establish “the rule of law” as a fundamental value of American constitutionalism. We had read various historians’ arguments in support of this somewhat disenchanting proposition—for example, an argument that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was itself “illegal”—and we had encountered historical evidence that many of the late-eighteenth-century American Founders did not conceive of the authority of law in terms of a rule or rules at all.

On that midsemester, November afternoon, Michael H. said that, although he had not changed his interpretation of the history

in question, he had changed his mind about what it meant. He explained, in effect, by invoking the authority of professionalism over the authority of what he called “the truth”: although, on the authority of the best evidence, he accepted the “truth” or “merit” of the proposition as historical scholarship, “as a lawyer” he “had to” reject that same proposition. Because of what our constitutional jurisprudence is “now” and because of “what has happened on September eleventh and since,” he felt it would be “unprofessional” for an American lawyer to deny that “the rule of law” is an authentic American constitutional value “founded on the Founding.” Michael H. was emphatic in distinguishing professionalism from patriotism: it was not as a good American, but rather as a responsible lawyer, that he felt he had to assert for “the rule of law” a historical pedigree that it “really” does not seem to have.

As a matter of current national welfare and constitutional jurisprudence, Michael H.’s point is arresting, and perhaps compelling. One might—and many of his classmates did that afternoon come to—conclude that, in light of the new and emerging realities of homeland security and the international war on terrorism, and in light of the current state and trends of American constitutional law today, American constitutionalism “just wouldn’t work” without, among other things, the myth of the pedigree in question. That it is a basic professional duty of all members of the American bar to help make the Constitution work went undisputed in our classroom.

The problematics of professionalism are everyday grist for classroom debate in law schools. Indeed, course work on taking professionalism seriously is (as a legacy of Watergate) a universal—in fact, the only universal—graduation requirement in American law schools today. But, as another student in the class, Mike B., put it, although all of us had plenty of experience, both inside and outside the classroom, with taking the con-

straints of lawyers' professionalism into account, and taking those constraints seriously, still, we might never before have taken them "to heart."

Michael H. was quick to endorse that distinction, and he said that September 11 and its aftermath now made just this distinction so important to him as a law student, "rather than a history graduate student," for example. In other words, he could not find any place in the American legal profession today for any proposition, historical or otherwise, that would have the practical effect of challenging any tenet of contemporary Constitutional faith.

My students have left me with these questions: as a historian teaching in a law school, do I have a professional academic duty to sustain—at least for the students who want it—an American constitutionalist faith, even when historical scholarship belies an important article of that faith? And, after September 11, how does current history matter in understanding such a question?

## The Call to Life

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**I**n the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, I said to a friend, "Now we are reminded of what governments are for." The shepherd is charged with protecting the flock. None of the goods human beings cherish, including the free exercise of religion, can flourish absent a measure of civic peace and security. If evil is permitted to grow, good goes into hiding. Evildoers who lurk and plot in darkness and secret, operate stealthily, and refuse to accept responsibility for wrongdoing perpetrate harm beyond the immediate vio-



lent event. It is they who would force good into hiding as we retreat behind closed doors.

What good do I have in mind? The simple but profound good that is moms and dads raising their children, men and women going to work, citizens of a great city making their way on streets and subways, ordinary people buying airplane tickets in order to visit the grandkids in California, men and women en route to transact business with colleagues in other cities, the faithful attending their churches, synagogues, and mosques without fear. Make no mistake about it: this quotidian idea, this basic civic peace is a great good. It is not the peace of the kingdom promised by Scripture. That awaits the end-time.

Our present condition reminds us of an earlier era when hatred and demagoguery spewed forth, shattering dreams and taking innocent lives. In the dark days of Nazi terror, a brave young German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who had been moving—remarkably so for a German Lutheran of his era—toward pacifism, committed himself to a conspiracy to assassinate Adolph Hitler, to cut off the head of the snake. He asked, Who stands fast? Bonhoeffer observed that the great evil that had appeared among the German people had “played havoc with all our ethical concepts.” He was particularly severe in his criticism of those who “flee from public altercation into the sanctuary of private virtuousness. But anyone who does this must shut his mouth and his eyes to the injustice around him. Only at the cost of self-deception can he keep himself pure from the contamination arising from responsible action.” Obedient and responsible action. One who cares about these, Bonhoeffer taught us, asks the following question: how is the coming generation to live?

We know what happens to people who live in pervasive fear. It isn't pretty. It invites lashing out and severe isolation from a desire to protect oneself. It encourages harsh measures because, and in this Thomas Hobbes was right, we simply cannot live as human beings if we live in constant fear of violent death.

Recently, my daughter and I found ourselves discussing the need for a family plan should there be a biological or chemical attack. The International Criminal Court or International Human Rights Tribunal is not going to protect us from that—or anything else. The world of international relations is not the same as a domestic legal jurisdiction that has, by definition, a punitive and enforcing arm. So we are forced to ask grave questions that were unthinkable a half a year ago: Who

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*In this he is wrong.*

JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN

would pick up all the children, the grandchildren? Where would we rendezvous? Should we buy gas masks? Should we discuss any of this with two five year olds and a seven year old? Already JoAnn, Christopher, and Bobby are drawing pictures of planes flying into buildings, and asking, “What happens if Grandma’s plane is hijacked?” We reassure them, knowing what the correct answer is: there is no more Grandma. Of course, we all must die one day, but we are called to life. Osama bin Laden has stated that Americans want to live, but that his followers yearn for death and that means that they will triumph. He believes that those committed to life won’t have the gumption to fight those claimed by death. In this he is wrong. There are times when the call to live demands action against those claimed by death. I do not believe this is contrary to our tradition. I believe it is consistent with it and with the fact that believers are claimed by a God of mercy who is also a God of justice.

## Back to Basics: The Law of War and the Illegal Fighter after September 11

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By the late nineteen-nineties, the law of war seemed a promising source of fresh ideas, new enforcement mechanisms, and compelling reasons for the adoption of both. International criminal courts were finally hearing cases of atrocities in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and in a number of European countries, national courts signaled also their willingness to try certain alleged human rights violators, regardless of where the deeds had occurred. In the United States, Congress gave federal courts broadened “long-arm” jurisdiction to hear certain human rights claims of foreigners against officials of their governments for atrocities committed overseas. There was also new substantive doctrine, as the law of war was said to include for the first time an express prohibition of gender crimes. Augusto Pinochet was detained, Libya surrendered the two Lockerbie suspects, President Clinton had a special “ambassador-at-large” for war crimes issues, wartime Swiss banking practices and refugee policy were the subject of official inquiries, Asian “comfort women” were encouraged to come forward, Cambodia and East Timor seemed likely to accept modified international tribunals, alternative mechanisms of accountability such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Lockerbie’s Scottish-court-sitting-in-the-



*[T]he law of war must rely less on altruism or the public tools of human rights politics and more on appeals to naked military self-interest.*

JONATHAN A. BUSH

Netherlands were devised, a permanent international criminal court was agreed upon, and even the conduct of a superpower undertaken with international support and for human-rights ends—the bombing campaign for Kosovo—was subject to scrutiny by international prosecutors in The Hague. In the activist community, it was self-evident that the agenda for the law of war in the new millennium was to tidy up doctrinal loose ends, encourage the recalcitrant United States to accept various multilateral treaties, and then move to creating more ambitious institutions and doctrines.

Yet even before September 11, it was apparent to less engaged observers that the crucial challenge for the law of war was not the future of new institutions and doctrines, but rather an older problem, maybe the oldest problem of all: regulating the conduct of the so-called unlawful or illegal fighter, including the partisan and the guerrilla, but especially the terrorist.

The bedrock premise of the law of war is that nations can maintain a bargain of sorts, based on both widely shared morality and mutual and well-channeled self-interest. In every war, certain people fight and others do not—soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants. The tacit agreement is that combatants on one side of a conflict will not attack their enemy's civilians, provided that noncombatants truly opt out of the fight. Under this arrangement, civilians can reasonably expect that they will not suffer military attack and soldiers, better able to focus on fighting at the front instead of watching their own backs, will be less trigger-happy. Furthermore, under this convention, soldiers who comply are entitled to honorable treatment as noncombatants in the event of capture. In actual practice, of course, these distinctions often blur. For example, is the worker in an arms factory a combatant or a non-combatant? Nor are the categories immutable: it was rightly deemed evidence of progress that “humanitarian law,” as it is called, came

to classify as noncombatants not only peasants upon whose land an army roamed, but also medical personnel, journalists, and members of the clergy, Red Cross, and other battlefield noncombatants (*hors de combat*).

For all that, this bargain has required certain understandings of what constitutes brave or admirable behavior and the modification of competing values. The sentry patrolling a pacified area who lets an unarmed trader pass will not be seen as “soft” but as honorable, and the citizen under occupation who desists from acts of sabotage will not be considered a coward or collaborator.

Those who conceived the law of war knew that there was necessarily a third category—neither lawful combatant nor lawful noncombatant—the illegal fighter. What distinguishes most illegal fighters from legal combatants is that illegal fighters exploit the benefits of stealth and surprise and so deny an opponent fair warning that they are on a mission of war. This distinction is crucial, because notice of attack allows, and obligates, an opponent to limit his damage to those who attempt to harm him.

The category of unlawful fighters has proven no problem for soldiers or international lawyers. Both agree that somewhere between a belligerent attack—to which a nation may respond with military force—and a criminal episode—against which a nation uses its domestic laws, police, and ordinary courts—there lie illegal war crimes, acts that are in some cases punishable summarily in the field and otherwise by special, typically military, courts applying the internationally sanctioned “laws and customs of war.” Some of these war crimes are morally atrocious by anyone's standards (pillage, genocide, or other atrocities that the public now terms war crimes). Other war crimes imply only contextual moral judgment on the perpetrator. The saboteur or spy is conceived of as an unlawful fighter who deserves praise for his daring if he makes it back to his own lines, and summary trial and punishment if captured by the

enemy. Although we lionize Nathan Hale, his British captors committed no legal wrong in executing him after only summary proceedings, nor did the Soviets violate international law in jailing Francis Gary Powers.

Of course, this schematic presentation ignores both nuanced definitions and widespread violations in practice. What is remarkable, however, is that this absurd system of chivalry has worked often enough, and still does. Whether it began as rudimentary international law, as a shared moral system, as Professor Michael Walzer argued, or “merely as sensible military regulations,” as General Telford Taylor wrote, does not matter. Nor is it relevant whether the policing mechanism for the bargain was not altruism but the hard fact that violation invited response: unchecked partisan activity by civilians led to brutal reprisals, while atrocities by an occupier invited further sabotage or ambush. What mattered was that the bargain seemed to work to the advantage of both sides. It is here, in the quiet fact that most soldiers overwhelmed in battle are taken prisoner rather than executed and most prisoners of war eventually come home, that the law of war system can be said to work, even in that most unrestrained of wars, World War II. It in no way diminishes German or Japanese culpability for genocide that the vast majority of British and American prisoners captured by Germany returned home after the war, as did almost all Germans captured by the Allies. Where the tacit bargain failed, it was not because ordinary battlefield passions overwhelmed impractical rules, but because racism led to extraordinary treatment (e.g., Japanese barbarity to captured British and Australian prisoners of war, the Nazi mass murder of captured Soviet soldiers, and, in an earlier age, North and South American settlers’ treatment of captured indigenous fighters).

Where the law of war bargain was honored, it was not only because of calculations of self-interest, but because its core values had taken root. Almost all military cultures accepted

that an honorable soldier should try to avoid face-to-face slaughter of civilians, that execution of a captured spy or saboteur was permissible, and that there were shared, acceptable definitions of civilian, spy, diplomat, the wounded, and the Red Cross representative. But the one area where there was neither agreement nor shared values concerned the irregular fighter—the guerrilla or partisan—where, as the cliché goes, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter (or holy warrior), a problem highlighted by the murderous attacks of September 11.

The failure of the law of war in this area is not for lack of effort. As early as 1862, Francis Lieber, an émigré German scholar teaching at the fledgling Columbia University Law School, sent a pathbreaking legal memo to Lincoln’s General-in-Chief, Henry Halleck, advising how Union troops should treat Confederate Colonel John Mosby, the “Grey Ghost,” and his guerrilla force in the Shenandoah. So learned was Lieber’s treatment of the question that Halleck recruited him as principal author of what is widely viewed as the first modern legal code of war. In this dress rehearsal for the full Lieber code, he distinguished carefully between guerrillas, partisans, brigands, and so forth, ultimately classifying more than a dozen categories of irregular fighters. However fair-minded Lieber’s efforts were, they persuaded only the converted. Forty years later, the elderly Mosby, who had gone from alleged war criminal to American ambassador and friend of President Grant, was still publishing articles arguing that he had neither been a partisan nor committed unlawful reprisals.

Subsequent formulations have proved equally unpersuasive in the 140 years since Lieber wrote his memorandum. The problem is not that drafters cannot find adequate legal formulae to identify core requirements for a lawful combatant. On the contrary, the widely accepted 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions set out clear, strict legal requirements that lawful combatants wear distinctive

signs recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, operate in units with accountable officers, and obey the rules of war. These criteria capture, in some measure, the reasons most people—outside the respective political constituencies—feel revulsion toward the more notorious guerrilla and terrorist groups active today (the Real IRA, Basque ETA, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the war bands of Sierra Leone, the mujahideen of Chechnya or Kashmir, or al Qaeda), for these groups are textbook examples of unlawful fighters who use subterfuge and deceit, forego fair notice, and indiscriminately target civilians. After September 11, even nations that had supported such groups made conspicuous show of distancing themselves. From this, it might seem that the law is clear and that it supports the emerging political consensus of who are unlawful fighters and what may be done to them.

But the truth is more complicated. There may indeed be a consensus as to which groups are illegal fighters, but history abounds with revered unlawful fighters we are completely unwilling to condemn. From the American Revolution, we have the Minutemen of Lexington and Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox”; from the anti-Nazi resistance, we have the Czech partisans and British agents who assassinated Heinrich Himmler’s deputy, Heinhard Heydrich. On occasion, a stout-hearted jurist will evaluate groups on both sides by fairly applying neutral legal tests. Thus, the judges in the “Hostage Case” at Nuremberg (1948) were willing to question not only the genocidal German behavior in the Balkans, but also violations by the Yugoslav Resistance, both Communist and Chetnik. The judges reaped a whirlwind of criticism for their efforts to view the law neutrally. Most people seem to believe the law condemns the cruel excesses of irregular units on the other side but makes an exception for the necessary daring-do of irregular units with which we sympathize (“freedom fighters,” soldiers in “wars of national liberation,”

“holy warriors,” or whatever else we call them). In short, the definition of lawful irregular fighters, unlike the value-neutral definition of the illegal saboteur and the lawful journalist or clergyman, almost never satisfies both sides in an armed conflict.

The source of this problem is neither a failure of draftsmanship nor the fact that belligerent sides frequently see advantage in using unlawful unconventional forces or means. It is that the rules themselves, un-



New York firefighter Lenny Tyrell (left) comforts fellow firefighter Leon Maraskaj, who has just learned that his cousin, another firefighter, perished in the collapse of the World Trade Center. Photograph by Ron Agam (ronagam.com). Also available through *Here Is New York*.

like the rules governing even crucial doctrines such as necessity or self-defense, are inevitably weighted toward either conventional or irregular forces. Consider the example of how the leading treaties define the irregular fighter. The Hague and Geneva Conventions required that, to be deemed lawful combatants, fighters meet the criteria listed above. Under that test, most guerrillas, if captured, did not qualify for protection, nor could they have complied, because identifying themselves in the field would have meant discovery and likely death. The consequences



were not only to exclude guerrillas from protection, but also to deny them an incentive to comply and thereby to visit misery on civilians as both sides fought in their midst without restraint. Thirty years later, an amended Geneva formula was negotiated (1977) that demanded less of guerrillas, requiring only that they reveal themselves at the last minute, en route to the attack. The negotiators hoped that most irregular fighters could be included in a legal framework and that, given protection, they would have incentive to comply with the rules of fair fighting and civilian immunity. But having tipped the balance in this way, the rules were now seen as unfairly skewed toward the guerrillas, who were no longer required to give fair warning before attacking conventional soldiers. Western nations, fearing that both innocent civilians and their conventional forces would be disadvantaged, demurred, and the United States still withholds ratification.

In a few years, the current consensus about terrorism will likely break down. When this happens, it will be not because of political pressures in, say, Iraq or Iran or Syria alone, but also because the rules on terrorism are not, and cannot be, evenhanded. Some critics argue that the older rules are too strict for irregular fighters to satisfy (Mohammed Atta would have courted arrest had he worn a distinctive bin Laden marking) and that, regardless of a general distaste for terrorism, certain struggles require irregular forces and means (if after September 11 that sounds cruel, they might point to anti-Nazi partisans or our Revolutionary War heroes). Yet if the requirements for irregular combatants are eased, as in the 1977 text, other critics point out that the irregular fighters are unreasonably privileged. Any law of war view of terrorists takes sides, in a way that is not true for spies and doctors, and by taking sides a legal rule loses its power to persuade.

If one lesson of September 11 reminds us of the limits of the law in this area, a more significant lesson is the possibility that we may

have erred in our entire approach to the law of war these past ten years. Throughout the nineteen-nineties, the goal of the law of war was to articulate broader, more protective standards and then to pressure nations to commit to adhering to them. The energy came chiefly from the human rights community, and the measure of success became whether nations, especially the United States, would agree with a new standard or implement post hoc enforcement mechanisms. September 11, however, shows that the law of war is not, in the main, about articulating high standards for behavior (there are already dozens of treaties, agreements, and formal statements condemning terrorism, especially involving planes or ships) and then pressuring or “naming and shaming” nations (or American senators) who fail to agree. In fact, this strategy of negotiate—ratify—embarrass has contributed to the present impasse, characterized by widespread formal agreement on norms and prohibitions among nongovernmental organizations and among nations that have no intention of complying and can withstand shaming and worse. (Iraq, for example, has long been signatory to the major prohibitions on gas, bacteriological, and chemical weapons.) A few of these brutal regimes may, like the Taliban, be routed or have their weapons of mass destruction destroyed or degraded, as the Israelis did to the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1981, but the “good guys”—the United States, NATO, the United Nations—have neither the resources, will, nor intention to eliminate all threats or rogue states. Most will remain part of our landscape.

For that reason, September 11 suggests that the first aim of an effective law of war ought not be how broadly it embodies human rights norms, but whether it secures compliance by regular military forces, irregular fighters, and even terrorists where possible. Compliance will not be secured by defining terrorism with greater exactitude, or by classifying terrorist attacks as either war (the response to which is

governed by the UN charter and norms) or crime (requiring trials with full due process), but in no event as both. Instead, the law of war must rely less on altruism or the public tools of human rights politics and more on appeals to naked military self-interest.

I have no illusion that it will be easy to identify tacit rules grounded in mutual self-interest with bitter enemies, much less secure the compliance of all sides with those rules. On the contrary, it will be more difficult than ever, because traditional law of war did not reckon with combatants willing to die as martyrs or with terrorist syndicates. But the effort is crucial. Worthy goals such as international tribunals to try Cambodian human rights abusers, the extradition of Pinochet, or apprehension of Radko Mladic have been (often expensive) distractions and must bear some of the responsibility for the gulf of distrust between the military and human rights communities. The core challenge for the law of war is to force or entice terrorist commanders and leaders of rogue states either out of power or into the fold. What happens to those perpetrators afterward (the trials vs. amnesty debate) is less important than the separate question of compliance and deterrence. To secure those goals, the law of war must use not only the threat of cruise missiles and trials, but also a legal framework for force that, paradoxically, terrorist and rogue states can accept and fight within. If we forgot that, perhaps September 11 has reminded us.

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*As [Immanuel] Levinas writes,  
“Morality does not belong to  
culture: [it] enables one to  
judge it.”*

NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES

## Peace-Time Crimes and the Violence of Everyday Life

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Violence is not a natural topic for the anthropologist. Everything in our training and disposition trains us, like so many inverse bloodhounds, on the scent of the good in human life and society. A basic premise guiding twentieth-century ethnographic research was, quite simply, to see, hear, and report no evil (and very little violence) in reporting back from the field. Indeed, the work of anthropology demands an explicit ethical orientation to “the other.” In times past, this was interpreted as a respectful distance, hesitancy, and reluctance to name wrongs, to judge, to intervene, or to prescribe change, even in the face of considerable human misery. In existential philosophical terms, anthropology, like theology, implied a leap of faith to an unknown, opaque other-than-myself, before whom a kind of reverence, distance, and awe was required.

The problem with interpretive anthropology (like theodicy) is that it is about making sense of a world that has become increasingly absurd. In the context of mass violence, death, and extreme social suffering, sense—and meaning making—is often fraught with moral ambiguities.

Six months later, we are still in a state of shock and raw grief in the wake of September 11, the events of which were to a certain extent overdetermined, even predictable, had “we” been more alert and attentive to the way that we—the passive beneficiaries of global affluence—are perceived from below, not in the hierarchical sense, but in the “view from the barrio,” from the refugee camp, from the

*favela*, from the inner city, and from the shantytowns and squatter camps where most of the world's populations live. (At any rate, we like to *think* these events were predictable, for who wants to face the possibility of an utterly random and chaotic world?)

In the days and weeks following the attacks of September 11 that have so challenged our sense of rootedness, our basic ontological security in the world, I found myself returning to a few key texts: Gabriel Marquez's *Chronicle of a Death Foretold*—how could we not have read the signs? Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* and *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, with its thesis on the utter banality of evil; Eichman seems so ordinary, so perfectly normal, a hard-working bureaucrat doing his best to rise up in the ranks of his institution. And W. B. Yeats's poem "Second Coming":

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;  
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and  
                  everywhere  
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;  
The best lack all conviction, while the  
                  worst  
Are full of passionate intensity.

Vincent Crapanzano's anthropological monograph, *Waiting*, had particular salience, with its portrait of ostrich-like South African whites buried in the inane *riduculosa* of everyday bourgeois life, hoping, wishing, *waiting* for the future, which (and *not only* in South Africa) is a black and brown future, to go away and pass them by.

Finally, I returned to René Girard's writings on sacrificial violence and the uses of the surrogate victim, the one whose death helps to resolve terrible, unbearable conflicts, difficulties, and collective anxieties. In the most recent instance, the sacrificial violence and victimhood were shared not only by the thousands of victims of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks but equally by the young terrorists (and their family members),

whose lives were held hostage by their religious convictions and who were readily, even eagerly, offered up, given up—*sacrificed*, that is—by their own religious and political leaders.

Individually and collectively, we grasp at straws, searching for meaning. At times of crisis and at moments of intense suffering people everywhere demand an answer to the existential question: "Why me, oh God? Why me? Why me of all people? Why now?" The quest for meaning may be posed to vindicate an indifferent God, to quell self-doubt, or to shore up a fragile faith in an orderly and just world.

At the same time, following a national emergency, an epidemic, a natural disaster, or a political attack, whenever tragedy hits an entire collectivity, the "Why me?" question often becomes the "Why *not* me?" "Why was I (of all people) spared?" as survivors try to find some logic, some coherence, some purpose even behind their exemption, their saving grace. The one thing humans seem unable to accept is the idea that the world may be utterly deficient in meaning.

I would argue that the attacks of September 11 are part of a continuum of violence that starts in ostensibly mundane ways and proceeds all the way to genocide. Everyday violence—normally directed against the least powerful and most dependent members of society, the homeless mad, the heroin addict, the common thief, the illegal immigrant, the welfare mother, the very young, or the very old—is so deeply inscribed in our ordinary, unexamined ways of life that no one is exempt, least of all the "critical and militant" anthropologist who from time to time has had to pause to consider her own "bystander" status as an anthropologist recording the misery of chronic hunger, child death, and the extermination of street kids in Brazil, on the one hand, and the woefully reduced status of her dear parents consigned to the "care" of a nursing home in Baltimore, on the other. Obviously, social and political

criticism must extend to self-criticism, to illuminating how ordinary, everyday ways of thinking, loving, and being in the world are implicated in the violence that we are trying to understand and to combat. The demons have not fled—we have faced the terrorist ... and she is also ourselves.

All forms of violence are sustained by the passively averted gaze. The critical lens moves in and out, intentionally juxtaposing the different levels of violence—macro and micro, economic, epistemic, and the deeply personal and subjective. Mass violence is part of a continuum; it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders, and even by victims themselves, as ordinary, routine, even justified.

The preparation for mass killing is found in social sentiments and in institutions ranging from the family to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. The early “warning signs” include an evolving social consensus toward the devaluation of certain forms of human life; a refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable and stigmatized social groups identified as “social parasites”; the militarization of everyday life (e.g., the growth of prisons, the un-reflexive acceptance of capital punishment, and proliferation of heightened technologies of personal security, including the house gun and gated communities); increasing social polarization, fear, and moral panics (such as the perceptions of the underclass, street children, or certain racial or ethnic groups as dangerous and socially polluting public enemies); and, finally, reversed feelings of victimization, as dominant social groups and social classes demand strong policing to put despised subordinate or marginal groups in their proper place.

Once recognized, how can the violence continuum be interrupted? Minimally, it requires a powerful social ethic to challenge the belief (one that may even be hidden to the conscious self) that certain despised or “alien” populations are better off dead or having never been born at all. I have found useful

Immanuel Levinas’s notion of the “primacy of the ethical,” which suggests certain culturally transcendent, transparent, and essential first principles. Anthropologists have traditionally understood morality as contingent on, and embedded within, specific cultural assumptions about human life. But there is another philosophical and theological position that posits “the ethical” as existing *prior to* culture. Some events, such as genocide and mass violence, are not amenable to a relativizing discourse. As Levinas writes, “Morality does not belong to culture: [it] enables one to judge it.”

The demand for mutual responsibility and accountability to “the other”—the ethical, as I define it—is *pre*cultural to the extent that our existence as uniquely social beings presupposes the presence of the other. “Basic strangeness,” the profound shock of misrecognition reported by some mothers in their first encounters with a newborn, is perhaps the prototype of all dangerously alienated “self-other” relations, including those leading to genocide and other forms of mass violence. Ultimately, as every new mother knows, for fragile life to grow and prosper, “basic strangeness” must eventually be overcome by “basic love.” The primacy of the ethical demands a radical de-estrangement, and deracialization, a surrender of one’s attachments and loyalties to old nations, old religions, old races, old social classes, and old entitlements. Martin Buber’s formulation of I-Thou over I-It relations certainly comes to mind.

Above all, it is essential that we all exercise a defensive hypervigilance and hypersensitivity to all the mundane, normative, and permitted acts of violence that are directed against certain “classes” of disqualified humans. Perhaps a collective self-mobilization for constant shock and hyperarousal about the little violences of everyday life is one ethical response to Walter Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency.”

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## Further Reading and Additional Resources

### Maura Lafferty

The American Council of Trustees and Alumni has been active in the debate over the war on terrorism. Particularly relevant to the reactions on campuses are “Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America” (<http://www.goacta.org/Reports/defciv.pdf>) and the fall issue of their newsletter, *Inside Academe* 6.4 (fall 2001), pp. 1ff. (<http://www.goacta.org/>, under “publications,” then “newsletter”). In addition, critical articles by David Horowitz and others appear in *FrontPage Magazine* and are available on-line (<http://www.frontpagemag.com>).

### Martin E. Marty

A reading (or rereading) of Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History* (New York: Scribners, 1952), which was written at the beginning of the cold war, is appropriate to the present time. In it, Niebuhr describes America as a kind of gadget-filled paradise suspended in a hell of international insecurity. What’s different today is that the cord has been cut and we are no longer suspended. We’ve “joined the human race.” The “irony” message is good because it is easy for us to gloat after our “victories” (e.g., in Afghanistan without being readied for consequent setbacks and frustrations). Yet we find motivation not to turn passive in spite of that perspective. Johan Huizinga, in *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, translated by Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), depicts a world of unsettlement in which daily life goes on.

### John Shelton Reed

C. Van Woodward’s essay “The Irony of Southern History” has been posted on the University of Virginia Web site (<http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR/woodward.html>). An account of the efforts of Columbia, South Carolina, schoolchildren to raise funds to purchase a fire engine for the Fire Department of New York is posted on the *New York Times* Web site (<http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/20011023snaptuesday.html>). After the attacks, *The New Yorker* posted on its Web site a collection of September 11-related essays (<http://www.newyorker.com/>).

### Henry Petroski

Suggested readings on the World Trade Center include Zdenek P. Bazant and Yong Zhou, “Why Did the World Trade Center Collapse?—Simple Analysis,” *Journal of Engineering Mechanics* 128 (2002): 2–6; Eric Darton, *Divided We Stand: A Biography of New York’s World Trade Center* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Angus Kress Gillespie, *Twin Towers: The Life of New York City’s World Trade Center* (Piscataway, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1999); and Henry Petroski, “The Fall of Skyscrapers,” *American Scientist* 90 (January–February 2002): 16–20.

### Marianne Hirsch

A related, but longer, essay was recently published in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* (<http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i20/20bo1101.htm>). Two particularly moving collections of photographs related to the September 11 attacks are available on-line: “Here Is New York: A Democracy of Photos” (<http://www.hereisnewyork.org>) and the work of Lorie Novak (<http://cvisions.cat.nyu.edu/>), whose photography illustrates this collection.

### Dale K. Van Kley

On Jean Calvin’s intellectual “iconoclasm,” some very telltale texts are to be found in the *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, edited by Jean-Daniel Benoit, 4 vols. (Paris: Vrin, 1957), 1:114, 120–21. On Calvinist iconoclasm in action, see among many good studies Phillis Mack Smith’s *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). The most up-to-date study of French revolutionary iconoclasm is François Souchal’s *Le vandalisme de la Révolution* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions, 1993), but the term “vandalism” as an antireligious kind of iconoclasm owes its coinage to the French revolutionary—and constitutional Catholic bishop—Henri Grégoire, who submitted a *Rapport sur les destructions opérées par le vandalisme et sur les moyens de le réprimer* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1794) to the post-Thermidorian Convention, followed by a second and third “rapport sur le vandalisme” during the same year. Max Weber’s argument that Calvinism gave rise to economic behavior resulting in modern capitalism is of course laid out in his classic *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930), but this line of thought

has been brilliantly reformulated and widened to apply to Christianity as a whole by Marcel Gauchet in *Le désenchantement du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), which argues that Christianity itself gave rise to secular society, and proved to be the religion of exit from religion. For whatever it is worth, Gauchet's book also contains an argument for why none of the other great religions of the "axial" period—most notably including Islam—could not have undergone a similar secularizing trajectory.

### Rafiuddin Ahmed

A number of readings provide an overview of Islam as well as discussion of fundamentalism, both generally and within Islam: Rafiuddin Ahmed, "Islamic Debate on Europe in Colonial Bengal: *Jihad* against the 'Infidels'?" *Ideas*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2001; Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen* (Delhi: Indological Books, 1969 [1871]); Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, editors, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), especially chapters 7, 10, 11, 16, 20, and 22–24; and Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, *The Islamic Law and Its Introduction in Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960). In addition, an extensive collection of historical photographs from South Asia and related information are available from Harappa.com.

### Stephen A. Conrad

Readings for further consideration include Bruce A. Ackerman, *We the People*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991–98); Sanford Levinson, *Constitutional Faith* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Judith N. Shklar, *Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

### Jean Bethke Elshtain

The just war literature is vast and rich, but the following small sampling provides readers with a good introduction to just war theory and its Augustinian origins: St. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, edited and translated by R. W. Dyson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics* (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1996), and *Just War Theory* (New York: New York University Press, 1992); and Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 3d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

### Jonathan A. Bush

The body of literature on the law of war has always been huge, and in the past ten years it has exploded, fueled by renewed interest in the Holocaust (and hence Nuremberg) and in current and future international tribunals (interest that took off with the news of atrocities in former Yugoslavia). The following volumes are highly recommended: Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, *Documents on the Laws of War*, 3d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), is the best recent and readily available collection of the leading treaties, along with valuable notes detailing which countries have accepted each instrument and with what conditions; Leon Friedman, ed., *The Law of War: A Documentary History*, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1972), is an excellent collection of the leading cases, with strong introductory essays by Friedman and Telford Taylor. Although the collection is outdated, the cases inevitably missing from this Vietnam War-era collection (Waldheim, Barbie, and Papon, the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals, Pinochet, and so on) are readily available on-line, and it is the pre-1972 cases collected here that are usually more difficult to locate. Telford Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy* (New York: New York Times Books & Bantam Books, 1972), is the best single essay on the historical development and modern applicability of the law of war.

## Nancy Scheper-Hughes

Many authors have explored the phenomena of violence and suffering in society and culture. Among the works directly related to the essay in this collection are Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Vintage, 1963), and *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1969), the last of which deals at length with politically motivated violence. The title of the essay in this collection was inspired in part by Franco Basaglia's "Peace-Time Crimes," in *Psychiatry Inside Out: Selected Writings of Franco Basaglia*, edited by Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Anne M. Lovell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). In *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove, 1963), Frantz Fanon examines the place of society's least-powerful members. For more on the assignment of blame and its role in violence, see Rene Girard, "Generative Scapegoating," in *Violent Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*, edited by R. Hamerton-Kelly (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987). The work of Immanuel Levinas is well represented by "Useless Suffering," in *Face to Face with Levinas*, edited by Richard Cohn (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). A "literary" perspective can be found in Gabriel Garcia Marquez, *Chronicle of a Death Foretold* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982). Examples of my own research on the subjects of violence, suffering, and death include Nancy Scheper-Hughes, *Death without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), "The Primacy of the Ethical," *Current Anthropology* 36(3); June 1995: 409–20, "Who's the Killer? Who's the Killer? Popular Justice and Human Rights in a South African Squatter Camp," *Social Justice* 22(3); 1995: 143–64, "Small Wars and Invisible Genocides," *Social Science and Medicine* 43(5); 1996: 88, "Maternal Thinking and the Politics of War," *Peace Review* 8(3); 1996: 353–8, "People Who Get Rubbished," *New Internationalist* (October 1997): 20–22, and "Un-Doing: Social Suffering and the Politics of Remorse in the New South Africa," *Social Justice* 25(4); 1998: 114–42. On terrorism and on politically motivated violence, see Jean Paul Sartre, excerpt of "Preface," in Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 7–31; Michael Taussig, "Talking Terror," in *The Nervous System* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Jeanne Franco, "Killing Priests, Nuns, Women, Children," in *On Signs*, edited by Marshall Borsky (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

1985), pp. 414–20; and Noam Chomsky, "The New War against Terror," in *An Evening with Noam Chomsky* (electronic document [<http://www.zmag.org/GlobalWatch/chomskymit.html>]). The volume *Fieldwork under Fire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), edited by C. Nordstrom and A. Robbins, contains a number of notable essays, among them Ted Swedenburg, "Prisoners of Love: With Genet in the Palestinian Field," and Joseba Zulaika, "The Anthropologist as Terrorist," pp. 25–40 and 206–22, respectively. Finally, on the subject of dealing with the aftermath of horrific events and episodes, see Blanchot Maurice, *The Writing of the Disaster* (Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Giorgio Agamben, "The Witness," in *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (New York: Zone Books, 1999), pp. 15–24; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, "Un-Doing: Social Suffering and the Politics of Remorse in the New South Africa," *Social Justice* 25(4); 1998: 114–41; Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 266–82; and Wole Soyinka, *The Burden of Memory: The Muse of Forgiveness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 23–36.

## Editor's Note

The information provided by the authors of this collection is but a small sample of what is available from innumerable sources. Most major news organizations have compiled collections of materials either giving the chronology of the attacks and the events that have followed or suggesting resources for further information. Many newspapers and broadcast media have compiled searchable story and image archives as well. Among the more scholarly offerings, the University of Chicago Press has collected a number of essays by its authors on different aspects of the September 11 attacks, titled "The Days After." The collection, along with numerous links to other sources, is posted on the University of Chicago Press Web site (<http://www.press.uchicago.edu/News/daysafter.html>).

In a similar vein, the American Association of University Presses has assembled an exhaustive bibliography of materials, for the most part published by its member institutions, on its Web site: "Books for Understanding" (<http://aaupnet.org/news/spotlight.html>). The AAUP site also includes scores of links.