In order to analyze the document below we must elaborate on two critical contexts. One is Welensky's position as a white worker, and as a spokesman for white workers, in an industry and a region where the great majority of workers (and people) were black Africans. The other is the larger political context: both Northern and Southern Rhodesia were British colonies. The question was, what would be British policy concerning their future?

On the Rhodesia Railways, white workers were outnumbered by black Africans at a ratio which ranged, depending on the exact moment, from 3-to-1 to 10-to-l. It will not surprise you that whites occupied the "skilled," elite, higher-up jobs, like locomotive engine drivers, firemen (those who moved the coal from the tender to the firebox on these steam engines), conductors, mechanics, electricians, clerks, etc. Africans worked as assistants to the above, on track maintenance, and as carriers, loaders, porters, and engine cleaners. (Needless to say, ALL "management" positions were held by whites. And almost everybody on the railways, white or black, was male.)

Thus there existed a "job color bar," whereby certain jobs were "reserved" for whites. This was not a matter of an explicit racial prohibition in the law (which actually would have been illegal in the British Empire), but a result of colonial "custom," the political power of white workers (which black workers lacked in a colonial situation), and euphemistic laws which favored whites in their actual effect. Exactly where the line would be drawn between white and black work was always a loaded and contentious question (as we will see below).
 

Whites were paid vastly more than blacks--from ten to thirty times as much per hour/day/month. Black labor was "cheap" for a variety of reasons: blacks needed colonial currency--shillings and pounds in this case--to pay compulsory "head (or hut) taxes;" some were forced directly to work for low wages, or recruited with misleading promises; some had lost their land, or were too far from markets, and so could not earn cash from crop sales; some wanted new consumer items for which they needed cash, etc. All of this produced over a time a large army of black migrant workers with little choice but to accept employment at the prevailing, "customary" low wages. Without such a cheap work force, many colonial enterprises were simply unviable.

The date on the document below is 1938, which leads us to the second context, the larger political one. By this date considerable demand had arisen from white settlers to "amalgamate" the Rhodesias. The settlers who supported amalgamation saw various advantages: a larger, combined political bloc, a larger, less fettered market, a consolidated pool of black labor, etc. The question of amalgamation was a serious one, because there were substantial differences between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. There were far more whites in Southern Rhodesia (though still a small minority). For all intents and purposes, the white settlers there ran their own show, with little interference from Britain. In Northern Rhodesia, on the other hand, not only were there fewer whites, but the British Colonial Office directly administered the territory, supposedly in the interests of the "native" black Africans. Thus many whites in Northern Rhodesia saw amalgamation as a means of strengthening their hand, by attaching themselves to the more powerful whites of Southern Rhodesia.

In 1938 the British Government dispatched a "commission of inquiry" to examine whether amalgamation was proper, desirable, or feasible. It was called the Bledisloe Commission, after its chairman, Viscount Bledisloe. The Commission toured both Rhodesias, hearing and receiving a great deal of testimony and evidence. Most of it, though by no means all, came from whites.

On the 15th of July the Commission came to Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia, and interviewed first a group of leading whites of the town, then a group of leading blacks. Roy Welensky, just elected to the territory's Legislative Council, was, not surprisingly, part of the first group. We are fortunate to have verbatim record of the questioning of Welensky by members of the Commission, and of his replies. Understandably, some Commissioners were particularly interested in the position of Welensky, a white worker, on the job color bar, as well as other issues.

Here are excerpts from the document:

[An exchange between Commissioner Fitzgerald and Welensky]:
Fitzgerald: "Today you would, I take it, not favor the policy in Southern Rhodesia of excluding natives from employment as artisans [i.e. skilled laborers] in large areas." [In Southern Rhodesia, euphemistic laws had the effect of prohibiting employment of Africans as artisans within 15 miles of any urban center.]

Welensky: "I am in the position of being one of the leaders of the Trade Unions in this country, I am the leader of the labouring men. I have expressed my views in the past that as the leader of one of the biggest organizations, I have no objection to the African being employed in any service, provided he is paid the same wage as the European, full Union rates."

Fitzgerald: "That proviso is rather awkward. The provision that he should be paid full trade union rates?"

Welensky: "If he is capable of doing the work he is capable of earning the wages."

Fitzgerald: "Does not cost come into the matter?"

Welensky: "In what respect?"

Fitzgerald: "There is this point, that the native in his own country can live a little more cheaply than the immigrant. That is no argument, of course, that the standard of wage should be brought to the level of the native. Your proposition is that he would be paid the same wage as the European if he can do the job as well as a white man?"
........ a bit later]

Welensky: "Speaking as a representative of the Trades
Union, I feel that if you employed them in the post where you would employ a white man you would have to pay them the same wages.
Chairman: "Take into account the different standard of living."

Welensky: "I appreciate that. It is obvious, in my opinion, that if one is as capable of doing the job as the other, and can be given a lower wage, he will naturally get the employment ."

{A bit later, another member of the Broken Hill delegation, Anderson, interposes.]

Anderson: "I think there are certain jobs which could be earmarked for natives, but there should also be the chance for the advanced African to go forward if he has the ability. I think that is what Mr. Welensky really means."

Fitzgerald: "What is the position today in these areas with regard to native artisans? Take the building trade: there is no restriction on his employment by contract presumed he can do the job?"

Welensky: "Not in Northern Rhodesia."

Fitzgerald: "But he is paid as a native, have you any objection?"

Welensky: "Provided he is kept in reasonable bounds, but there must be a limit to it. He is going to work the European artisan out of it if he does it at a lower rate."

Fitzgerald: "If need arose you feel that the European must be protected from competition by the native?"

Welensky: "That is why I am inclined to feel that partial segregation is the best scheme. I am speaking for myself, that is my private opinion."

[Notice that Welensky has used one of the keywords of the twentieth century in many places, including the United States--"segregation." Here are some more exchanges on segregation, featuring Stewart Gore-Browne, Welensky's friend and a member of the Legislative Council charged with representing "native interests.'']

Mr. Mainwaring [a Commissioner with a trade union background in Britain]' "With regard to segregation, which has become almost as confusing as the word 'Mesopotaemia,' it is so difficult to know what people really mean. Supposing we consider the native problem in both of these territories in the standpoint of existing conditions, is there any need to use the word segregation at all? What does this word segregation really imply in the minds of the people?"

Gore-Browne: "It is a very bad word to use."

Mainwaring: "It seems to imply a forceful seclusion, in some corner, of natives now presumably somewhere else?"
Gore-Browne: "That is really not my intention."

Mainwaring: "I think it is correct that in the policy outlined by the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia he uses the word segregation in the sense that he wants to develop areas that are now in the possession of natives?"

Welensky: "We did not intend to convey that impression [of "forceful seclusion in some corner"] at all. Mr. Huggins' policy is what we more or less favor."

Gore-Browne adds: "personally what lies in the back of my mind is that we should guarantee him an area where he could be certain that he would be allowed that development, whatever happened in the future."

[Earlier, Gore-Browne had this to say on segregation. ]
Gore-Browne: "I think we all realize that complete segregation is impossible... I think the general feeling is that some modified segregation holds out the best hope for avoiding racial friction."

Mainwaring: "Taking the question of the employment of the native, perhaps you and I can discuss it with more appreciation because we are two Trade Unionists. The scope of employment that is available and to be made available to the native. No white man, [just] because he is a white man, would be entrusted with a locomotive?"

Welensky: "I agree."

Mainwaring: "It is all a question of experience, training, capacity. Take the native--we will discuss it from the standpoint of the railway industry. It must have a certain amount of unskilled labour, whether it be white or African. Then I would suggest that promotion from that level of unskilled labour depends on capacity. Are you prepared as a Trade Unionist here in this territory to permit, where he displays capacity, the native to rise in the level of grades of employment in the railway?"

Welensky: "Personally I am."

Mainwaring: "This is very important, because in Southern Rhodesia you will find the opposite of that expressed by the [white] Labour Party industrially and politically. You made reference to the 15 mile radius in which the present restrictive policies apply. Do you know it is the declared intention of [white] organized labour in Southern Rhodesia to extend that limit to the boundaries of the territory?"

Welensky: "I did not know that."

[Down a bit] Mainwaring' "That is their declared aim. What would be the attitude of Northern Rhodesia if they were asked to apply that restrictive policy."

Welensky: "I would oppose it."

Watson [another delegate]: "As far as we are concerned, definitely."

Welensky: "I personally feel that if the native advancement could continue and I did not feel he was being used to lower my standard of living, that I would be quite agreeable to any advancement he might make. But I do not want him used as a tool to lower my standard."
Mainwaring: "I recognize that. It is the Trade Unionist's first business to maintain the standard of living of the members."

Commissioner Evans: "I was impressed by Mr. Welensky saying that you were in favor of seeing the native move forward so far as ability would allow him. Is there any danger that that might be defeated by the hesitation of any members of your Union to work side by side with him."
Welensky: "There is that possibility."

Evans: "Do you realize that possibility?"

Welensky: "Yes"

Colcutt [another delegate]: "They have found little difficulty on the Copper Belt, natives and Europeans working on the same class of work."
 

Welensky: "I think Mr. Colcutt will agree with me that the feeling is that the native of Africa is not being uplifted, he is being exploited at the expense of the European. I am satisfied that if the men were satisfied that he was not being exploited it would be a different story altogether."
 

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